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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaint iff/appellee, 
vs • 
JOHN BURKE, 
Defendant/Appellant 
ADDENDUM TO EXHIBITS 
Case No. 930012-CA 
Priority 2 
Please take notice of the Attached ADDENDUM TO EXHIBITS 
which are points and authorities relevant to the case at Appeal. 
These Addendum are presented by Appellant to further clarify 
the laws as they pertain to this case and to submit to this Court 
information to assist in its judgment. 
SUBMITTED this 10th day of June, 1994 
MICHAEL J.S. THOMPSON 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
881 South Orem Blvd. Suite Three 
Orem, Utah 84058 
Telephone (801)223-9044 
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PERTAINING TO EX POST FACTO LAW 
(Relevant to the case at bar) 
1. Statement re: Article I, Section 10 U.S. Constitution 
2. Newspaper article re: Law passed and applied to this matter 
ex post facto 
3. City Ordinance (15-94) 
Ex Post Facto a law passed after the fact is not 
Constitutional, if invoked to inforce someone to comply 
Article 1/ sec. 10 U. S. Constitution wherein the states are 
forbidden to pass any Ex Post Facto law. 
The power of the lower Court is limited to the powers set forth 
in the state statue, and to exceed that power is not permitted, 
as in the Judgment of the Court for the taking or removing of 
the property of the Defendant, as the property is of value and 
a equity does exsists, therefore the Circuit Court, not being 
one of equity cannot impose a taking of goods that have value, 
and are not of consequence to the case in the protection of 
the public such as drugs, guns explosives, ect. therefore to 
order the confication of the property of the Defendant is a 
direct violation of the powers given the Circuit Court by the 
statues. 
The complaintant of record Don Butler, has committed the act 
of abuse of process, wherein the complaint was signed for the 
purpose of forceing the Defendant to sell the property to him 
as he contends that he owns the property on either side of the 
Defendant, therefore the abuse of the process arises out of 
malice to the Defendant, through the intent to force the de-
fendant to sell by presure brought to bear through the wrongful 
complaint by Don Butler that the property of the Defendant de-
values his adjoining properties owned by Don Butler, as per 
the court record. An affidavit is so attached from the real-
estate agent to attest to the fact of Don Butler approching 
him about the purchase of the Defendant's property. 
The prosecuting attorney, Junior Baker, has also violated the 
abuse of process law, by the addmission before witnesses to 
the knowledge of the property having value, thereby if the 
property has value then it cannot be in the definition of the 
ordinance as junk, as was presented by the Plaintiff's attorney 
Junior Baker in his presentation of the evidence in the trial 
of the Defendant. This statement is confirmed by the addmission 
of Junior Baker before a witness, after the trial had taken 
place. This witness has furnished an affidavit of this fact 
to the defence, wherein the possibility of milicious prosecu-
tion may stand, or at the very least abuse of process. There 
is also a affidavit from the Defendants attorney, Paul Merrill 
attorney of record at the trial, as to the addmission of the 
property of the Defendant having value, by the Prosecuting 
attorney to Paul Merrill prior to the trial. 
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Spanish Fork Council gives nod 
to conditional-use ordinance 
By Rom myn Skipper 
De$eret News staff writer 
SPANISH FORK—"Yes, but 
»> 
The City Council can grant per-
mitTequests that way, as a result of 
its passage of a conditional-use or-
dinance in Wednesday's council 
meeting. 
The conditional-use permit can 
be used when a site plan meets zoii 
ing requirements, but the council < 
wants to impose stricter regula- * 
tiw$ than the zoning requires, ex-
plained city administrator David 
Oy%V Whereas the city could say 
only "yes" or "no" before the ordi-
nance, it can now say "yes, but . . ." 
Conditional-use permits will be 
used mainly in industrial and 
heavy commercial zones, Oyler 
said. Gravel pits near residential 
areas are a prime example of 
where the permit would be help-
ful, he said. 
The council then has the free-
dom to say, "It can be a permitted 
use, with these conditions," Oyler 
said. "Then we list the conditions" 
such as safety requirements, pollu-
tion standards, landscaping re-
quirements and limits on operation 
hpuxs,hesald. 
"It gives us a little more flexibil-
ity vtfthout writing separate ordi-
nances (for gucb Exposal)," Oyler 
said. 
The city discontinued an earlier 
conditional-use law 12 years ago 
because the council felt it was too 
political, Oyler said. 
The current council admitted 
that it could become political but 
voted unanimously to pass the or-
dinance. 
"I think this gives you a little 
wiggle room and a little leeway to 
do something," Councilman Clyde 
Swenson said, 
A public hearing will be h&ld be-
fore the council grants any condi-
tional-use permits, and the permit 
can be revoked if any condition 
ceases to be met 
M 
BIKE 
Continued from Bl 
Rosenbaum said the city doesn't 
want to put Warthen out of busi-
ness; it just wants him to make his 
outside area "manageable, practi-
cal and workable." 
"He's done a little bit," 
Rosenbaum admitted, "but a very 
little." 
Warthen has thousands of junk 
parts, including 400 old rims, and 
has very little turnover in inven-
tory, Rosenbaum said. 
Warthen said much of what the 
city calls junk is viable merchan-
dise, albeit old and sometimes 
rusty. For example, people buy 
used quick-release hubs from 
Warthen for $5 and use them in 
making their own bike racks for 
their truck beds. Buying a new 
rack costs $38, Warthen said. 
Warthen has customers from as 
far north as West Jordan and as 
far south as Richfield, he said, be-
cause he is the only person who 
stocks used parts in such quantity. 
A man recently bought 20 frames, 
back wheels and cranks from 
Warthen, something he couldn't 
have done as cheaply from any 
other source, the businessman 
said. 
Warthen will go to court Thurs-
day. If he loses, he may face a 
$1,000 fine and jail time until his 
lot is cleaned, he said. 
Rosenbaum said city officials 
don't want to send Warthen to jail, 
they just want him to ttean up his 
property. 
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- ROLL CALL 
VOTING 
MAYOR MARIE HUFF 
(votes in case of tie) 
CLYDE A. SWENSON 
City Councilman 
THORA L. SHAW 
City Councilman 1 
REX WOODHOUSE 
City Councilman 
JERALD M. CHAPPLE 
City Councilman 
KIM H. PETERSON 
City Councilman | 
YES 
! 
; 
NO 1 
L 
I move that this ordinance 
be adopted. 
City Councilman 
I second the foregoing motion, 
City Councilman 
ORDINANCE NO. Os-ri 
AN ORDINANCE ALLOWING FOR CONDITIONAL USES 
WHEREAS, Spanish Fork City zoning ordinance does not currently 
provide for conditional uses; and 
WHEREAS, the City can more readily protect the health, safety, 
and welfare of its residents by allowing certain conditional uses in the 
industrial zones; and 
WHEREAS, the conditional uses should be an exception, rather 
than the rule and should be issued only after scrutiny by the various 
city commissions and committees; 
NOW THEREFORE, be it ordained and enacted by the Spanish Fork 
City Council as follows: 
CHAPTER 17.68 
CONDITIONAL USES 
17.68.010 Conditional Uses. 
Those uses identified in the land use chart as conditional 
uses may be allowed upon obtaining a conditional use permit as outlined 
1 
in this chapter, 
17•68•020 Application. 
Conditional use permits may be applied for on a form provided 
by the City. The application shall require the applicant to identify 
the specific use, the exact location, and to pay a processinq fee in the 
amount to be set from time to time by resolution of the City Council. 
17•68.030 Procedure• 
A. Upon receipt of an application, the City shall forward the 
proposed site plan to the Development Review Committee. The Development 
Review Committee shall review the proposed site plan to determine if it 
complies with the city master plan, with all city ordinances, 
resolutions, and policies. If the proposed site plan is found to 
comply, it shall be forwarded to the Planning Commission for review. 
B. The Planninq Commission shall review the proposed site 
plan and shall consider the factors set forth in 517.68.040. The 
Planning Commission shall act as a recommending body to the City Council 
on conditional use permit applications, and shall recommend approval, 
deniaL, or approval with specified conditions. 
C. The City Council shall be the final approving authority 
for all applications for conditional use permits* The City Council 
shall review the proposed site plan and the recommendation from the 
Planning Commission. Applications for conditional use permits shall 
either be approved, denied, or approved with conditions. The validity 
of the permit shall be conditioned upon strict compliance with 
applicable city ordinances, the approved site plan, and any additional 
conditions or requirements imposed by the City Council. 
a 
17.68.040 Factors to be Considered. 
A. The following factors shall be weighed and considered when 
determining whether conditional use permit applications should be 
approved, denied, or approved with conditions: 
1. Harmony of the reguest with the general objective of the 
master plan, the zoning ordinance, and the particular zone in which the 
reguest is located; 
2. Harmony of the reguest with the existing uses in the 
neighborhood; 
3. Development or lack of development adjacent to the site; 
4. Whether or not the reguest may be injurious to potential 
development in the vicinity; 
5. Present and further reguirements for transportation, 
traffic, water, sewer, storm drainage, power, streets and roads, and 
other infrastructure of the city; 
6. Suitability of the specific property for the proposed use; 
7. Number of other similar conditional uses in the area and 
the public need for the conditional use; 
8. Economic impact on the neighborhood; 
9. Aesthetic impact on the neighborhood; 
10. Safeguards needed to prevent noxious or offensive 
emissions such as noise, glare, dust, pollutants, and odor; 
11. Attempts by the applicant to minimize other adverse 
effects on people and property in the area; 
12. Impact on the proposed use, on the health, safety, and 
welfare of the city, the area, and persons zoning or leasing property in 
2 
the area. 
B. Conditions imposed are at the discretion of the council, 
but may include such items as minimum and maximum setback requirements 
on front, rear, and side yards; limitations on building size and height; 
landscaping requirements; parking requirements; lighting requirements; 
fencing requirements; noise restrictions; limitations on hours of 
operation; pollution restrictions; and such other conditions as may be 
deemed necessary to protect the neighborhood. 
17.68.050 Other Requirements. 
The holder of a conditional use permit shall be held to all of 
the requirements relating to site plan approval, improvement, bonding, 
maintenance, and completion as required by Spanish Fork City. The 
conditional use permit shall not be valid until the required bond has 
been posted. Nothing in this chapter shall be interpreted to waive the 
bonding, licensing, or permit requirements set forth in other city 
ordinances, resolutions, or policies. 
17.68.060 Public Hearing. 
Upon receivinq the recommendation from the Planning 
Commission, the City Council shall schedule a public hearing, giving at 
least fourteen days notice of the same by publication in a newspaper 
having general circulation within the city. After the public hearing, 
the City Council may accept the recommendations of the Planning 
Commission, reject the recommendations, or accept part of the 
recommendations and reject part of the recommendations made by the 
Planning Commission. 
17.68.070 Conforming Use, Duration. 
1 
Upon approval of the conditional use permit, the applicant may 
proceed as a conforming use, provided all of the conditions are met. 
The permit may be revoked if any condition ceases to be met. A building 
permit must be obtained within six months of the approval of the permit. 
If a building permit is not obtained within six months, a new 
application must be submitted. 
17.68.080 Amendment or Revocation. 
A. Interested party. Any interested party may apply to the 
City for the amendment or revocation of a conditional use permit. For 
purposes of this section, "interested party" shall include the following 
persons or entities: 
1. The owner or lessee of the property for which the 
conditional use permit was granted. 
2. The City. 
3. Any adjacent owner or lessee of property for which 
the conditional use permit was granted. 
4. Any person that can show that the conditional use has 
a direct impact on his or her health, safety or welfare. 
B. Fee. Any person or entity, other than the City, seeking 
to amend or revoke a conditional use permit, shall pay a fee in an 
amount established by resolution of the City Council. 
C. Procedure. The procedure for amending or revoking a 
conditional use permit shall be the same as the original application 
procedure set forth in Section 17.68.020. 
D. Justifications. A conditional use permit may be amended 
at the request of the holder of the permit upon a showing of good cause. 
5 
A conditional use permit may be amended or revoked at the request of any 
other interested party if the City Council finds one or more of the 
following: 
1. That the conditional use permit was obtained by 
misrepresentation or fraud. 
2. That the use for which the permit was qranted has 
ceased or has been suspended for six months. 
3. That the holder or user of the conditional use permit 
has failed to comply with any of the conditions placed on the issuance 
of the permit. 
4. That the holder or user of the conditional use permit 
has failed to comply with any city, state or federal law qoverning the 
conduct of the use. 
5. That the holder or user of the conditional use permit 
has failed to construct or maintain the site as shown on the approved 
site plan. 
6. That the operation of the use or the character of the 
site has been found to be a nuisance or a public nuisance by a court of 
competent jurisdiction in any civil or criminal proceeding. 
E. Hearing. No conditional use permit shall be amended or 
revoked against the wishes of the holder or user of the permit without 
first giving him or her an opportunity to appear before the City Council 
and show cause as to why the permit should not be amended or revoked. 
Amendment or revocation of the permit shall not limit the City's ability 
to initiate or complete other leqal proceedinqs aqainst the holder or 
user of the permit. 
£ 
17.68.090 Appeals. 
The decision of the City Council may be appealed to the 
District Court within thirty days of the decision. A written decision 
need not be issued by the council as long as a decision is made in a 
public meeting which includes a conditional use permit as an agenda 
item. Only the applicant or adjoining property owner shall be entitled 
to appeal. The District Court shall affirm the decision of the City 
Council unless it finds by clear and convincing evidence that the 
decision was arbitrary and capricious. 
II. This ordinance shall become effective twenty days after 
publication. 
DATED this day of , 1994. 
2 
ADDENDUM TO SECONDARY AUTHORITY 
(Reply Brief) 
lAm.Jur . ABUSE OF PKOCKSS 
Wlicre the mat ter complained of concerns the issuance of process, the action 
is either strictly or by analogy one for malicious prosecution, hi this category 
are included actions for the malicious institution of criminal proceedings, the 
wrongful and malicious procurement of at tachment or other process of seizure, 
and the institution of bankruptcy proceedings. In such cases it is, for obvious 
reasons, generally held (hat want of probable cause and the existence of 
malice in procuring the issuance of the process, as well as a termination favor-
able to the plaintiff, are essential to the maintenance of the action. But 
where the thing complained of is not that issuance of the process was wrong-
fully pnreurcd, but that, having been issued, it was wilfully perverted, so as 
to accomplish a result not commanded by it or lawfully obtainable under it, 
the action has been denominated by well-considered cases as one for the abuse 
of process.8 
Therefore, the distinction between actions for malicious prosecution and 
those for abuse of process is of importance as bearing upon the necessity of 
establishing malice and want of probable cause. Fur ther , the former action 
may not be brought if the action in which it purportedly occurred has not 
been terminated, or has terminated adversely to the par ty prosecuted, h i 
the latter action, on the other hand, it is not a defense to show that the action 
has not been terminated, or to show that it has been terminated adversely to 
the party who seeks to enforce his right for the abuse of process.9 
The cases based upon a pure abuse of process are comparatively few, though 
there are numerous cases referred to and cited as such which are, in fact, ac-
tions for malicious prosecution. It is also to be noted that the facts of a 
particular case m iy justify an action either for malicious prosecution or for 
the abuse of process. In other words, an abuse of process may occur in the 
course of a prosecution which has been malicious and wrongful through-
out.10 
§ 4. Distinguished from Action for False Imprisonment.—An action for 
abuse of process is to be distinguished from that for false imprisonment in that 
in the former action the process is valid and in itself justifies the restraint or 
imprisonment. To establish a wrong and a consequent remedy for such abuse, 
it must be shown that the machinery of the law was oppressively or fraud-
ulently used or misused. On the other hand, in false imprisonment, the es-
sence of the tort consists in depriving the plaintiff of his liberty without law-
ful justification, and the good or evil intention or purpose of the defendant 
neither creates nor excuses the tort. The gist of the plaintiff's grievance is 
the use against him of actual or threatened force.11 
The common-law classification of the different causes of action has ceased 
to be important under modern rules of pleading, but that the common-law 
distinction is important may be seen from the fact that the validity of legal 
process and the service thereof is a defense to an action for false imprison-
ment, but is not a defense where there is an illegal abuse of process.12 
Annotation* 80 A . L i t 580 et seq.: Ann. See FALRH IMPRISONMENT [Also 11 R. C. L. 
Cas 1915A, 8SI p. 791, § 3} 
S Annotat ion 80 A L R 5<0 12 PaKo \ Citizens1 BKg. Co 111 Ga 73, 
0 At lanta Tee & Conl Co v Reeves 13(> ,'JG s . E 418, 51 L It A UI,t, 78 Am St Rep 
(Ja 291, 71 S E 421, 30 L R A (N S ) 1112 114. Trvon v Phu; iee , 112 Mich. 33X, 70 
Annotat ion- 3fi L l t A ( N S ) 1112. N YV. 905, 37 L R.A 22?, (w Am. St. Rep. 
See infra, §§ 8, 9. 398, J ackson v. Amer ican Teleph. & Teleg. 
10 Annota t ion- 80 A.L R K81. Co. 139 N. C. 347, 51 S. E. 1015, 70 L.R.A. 
11 Jackson v. Amer ican Teleph. & Tcleg. 7,*S-
Co. 139 N C 347, 51 S. E. 1015, 70 L R.A. See FALSE IMPRISONMENT [Also 11 R. C. L. 
738. p. 794, § 6; p. 795, §§ 7 et seq . ] . 
[1 Am. Jur.]—12 177 
§§ 524, 525 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 12 Am. Jur. 
such instanees, which are ra re , the court infers tha t obviously no proof of 
inval id i ty would be required.1 8 In a case, however, in which classiPicalion 
is su i tab ly chal lenged and the ra t ional basis claimed for it is predica ted upon 
the pa r t i cu la r economic facts of a given t rade or indust ry , which facts are 
outs ide the sphere of judicia l notice, they are proper ly the subject of evi-
dence and of finding. With the notable expansion of the scope of govern-
menta l regula t ions and the consequent assertion of violation of constitu-
tional r ights , it is increasingly impor tant that when it becomes necessary 
for the Supreme Court to deal with the facts re la t ing to par t icu la r commer-
cial or indus t r ia l condit ions, they should be presented concretely with appro-
p r i a t e de te rmina t ion upon evidence, so tha t conclusions shall not be reached 
without adequa te factual support . 1 9 One of the s ta te cour ts has held quite 
genera l ly , on the other hand, wi thout qualifying its l anguage as to the eco-
nomic s i tuat ion which may be involved, that if a s t a tu t e on its face is genera] 
in t e rms and appl icable al ike to all members of a class, evidence will not 
be t aken to show tha t such a classification is not a legal one.1 
§ 524. Const ruc t ion of S ta te S ta tu tes .—Before the Supreme Court, of the 
United Sta tes can judic ia l ly declare that a s ta te s t a tu t e as construed by the 
s ta te cour ts denies the equal protect ion of the laws, it must appear that the 
s t a tu t e as thus construed and applied by the s ta te court of last resort bases 
d iscr iminat ion upon a r b i t r a r y distinct ions.2 A mere charac ter ize! ion, how-
ever, of a s t a te s ta tu te , such as a t ax ing s ta tu te , by the court of la^t resort 
of the s ta te is not b inding upon the Federal Supreme Court , which will deter-
mine for itself the effect of the s t a tu t e under the equal protection clause.3 
C. S P E C I A L B U R D E N S AND PRIVILEGES 
1. I N GENERAL 
§ 525. Genera l ly .—The theory unde r ly ing const i tu t ional requ i rements of 
equal i ty is that all persons in like c i rcumstances and like condit ions must. 
be t r ea ted al ike, both as to privi leges conferred and as to liabilities or bur-
dens imposed.4 Any s t a tu t e which imposes special res t r ic t ions or burdens 
on, or g r an t s special privileges to, certain persons engaged in a business, 
which bu rdens or pr ivi leges are not imposed on, or g ran ted to, olher persons 
engaged in the same business under the same c i rcumstances , is invalid.5 In 
the appl icat ion of the F o u r t e e n t h Amendmen t to the Consti tut ion of the 
Uni ted Sta tes , no dis t inct ion is to be observed between the effect of privi-
leges conferred and the effect of bu rdens imposed. A privilege conferred 
upon one class is a d iscr iminat ion in favor of t ha t class and against all o thers 
u c t s Co. v. B a l d w i n , 293 II. S. 194, 79 F . ed. Sew inu Mach . Co. v. Bi irkell , 233 U. S. 
281. 55 S C(. 187. 304, 58 L. ed. 97t. 31 S. Ct. 493; P l y m o u t h 
18 B o r d e n ' s F a r m P r o d u c t s Co. v. P a i d - t 'ua i Co. v. P e n n s y l v a n i a , 2.M.2 U. S. 521, 
win , 293 IT. S. 19*. 79 I,, ed 281. 55 S. CI. r>8 L o d - 7 i n . - * s - Ct. 359; A d a m s v. 
J 87. See a l so Mayf lower F a r m s v. T e n Russoll . 229 U. S 353, 57 F. ed. 122 1, 23 
Evek , 297 U. S. 2(i6, 80 F. ed. G75. 5G S. Ct. s - r ( - 8 J f ^ Baeh t e l v. Wilson. 20 1 U. S. 
457, 2(1, f>l L. ed. 2f,7. 27 S. Ct. 2 12. 
19 B o r d e n ' s K a m i P r o d u c t s Co. v. B a l d - 3 Q u a k e r Ci ty Cab Co. v. P e n n s y l v a n i a , 
win, 293 U. S. 10 1, 79 F. ed. 281, 55 S. Ct. 277 V. S. 389, 72 F. ed. 927, 4S S. Ct. 553; 
187 Louisvi l le ( Ins & F. Co. v. Co leman , 277 
1 C o n s u m e r s ' F e a ^ u e v. Co lo rado & S. U - S" *2- 12 T" " ] > 7 7 ( ) « 4 S *• <**• M-
R. Co. 52 Coin. 54, 125 P. 577, Ann . Cas . 4 Soo s u p r a . § 4f,9. 
1914A, 1158. 5 Klliott v. S t a t e . 29 Ariz . 289, 2 12 P. 310. 
2 F a k e S h o r e & M. S. R. Co. v. C l o u s h . 40 A.F.R. 281; S t a t e v. C a r d nor. 58 Ohio 
242 U. S. 375, til F . ed. 374, 37 S. Ct. F H ; St. 599, 51 N. F. 13G, 41 F.R.A. fi89. 05 Am. 
*>M„™„,.i T,- & rV r? r n v r n ( l p 233 u s s t ll(l]) 7fSrj. S l . l t 0 v Writfhl , 53 Or. 311, 
not similarly endowed just as a burden upon one class is a discrimination 
against it and in Favor of all others not similarly afflicted.6 
A privilege or a burden is or is not a denial of the equal protection of the 
laws according to whether the discrimination relates to a matter upon which 
classification is legally permissible and, if so, whether the classification is a 
reasonable one.7 
2. E Q U A L I T Y OF B U R D E N S 
§ 526. Generally.—In the exercise of the undoubted right of classification, 
it may often happen that some classes arc subjected to regulations and some 
individuals are burdened with obligations which do not rest on other classes 
or other individuals not similarly situated, but this fact does not necessarily 
vitiate a statute, because it would practically defeat legislation if it were 
laid down as an invariable rule that a statute is void if it does not bring all 
within its scope or subject all to the same burdens.8 
The general rule as to classification in the imposition of burdens is that 
no one may be subject to any greater burdens and charges than are im-
posed on others in the same calling or condition9 or in like circumstances.10 
No burden can be imposed on one class of persons, natural or artificial, and 
arbitrarily selected, which is not in like conditions imposed on all other 
classes.11 Thus, a statute imposing absolute liability upon telegraph com-
panies for injuries caused by their poles, wires, and apparatus, while not 
applying to others utilizing similar apparatus, unconstitutionally deprives 
such companies of the equal protection of the laws.12 The Supreme Court 
has stated in a general way that the guaranty of the equal protection of the 
laws forbids that, one class should by law be compelled to suffer losses that 
others may make gain.13 To hedge a privilege about with conditions and 
exactions for one class which do not exist for others likewise violates the 
equality provision of the Constitution.14 
6 Hill v. Uae, 52 Mont. 378, 158 P. 82G, 207 Mass. 601, 94 N. R 558, 34 HH.A.(N.S.) 
RH.A.1917A, 495, Ann. Cas. 191710, 210. 004; Donnell v. State. 48 Miss. (Hil, 12 Am. 
7 T 1 . , Hep. 375; Sta te v. Cudahy Packing Co. 33 
' Mont. 179, 82 P. 833, 114 Am. St. Hep. 80 1. 
8Co(thitf v. Kansas City Stock Yards Co. 8 Ann. Cas. 717; S ta te v. Savage 90) Or. 
(Cutting v. Codard) 183 U. S. 79, 40 L. ed. 5^
 l 8 4 p 5 f i 7 | 1 8 9 p 4 2 7 < c i l i n o [L c T j . 
92, 22 S. Ci. 30. ^ Jones v. Union County, 03 Or. 500, 127 P. 
In enactincj provisions necessary for the 781, 4^ L i t A.lX.S.) 1025; Steed v. Harvey, 
protection of the public health, conditions is Utah, 307, 5 1 P. 1011, 72 Am. St. Hep! 
may exist that make it necessary to im- 789; S ta te v. Shedroi, 75 V t 277 54 A* 
pose upon some persons grea te r burdens 1081. 03 RH.A. 179, 98 Am. St. Hep. 825; 
than upon others not similarly s i tuated. Sta te v. Derin^, 84 Wis 585, 51 X W 1104 
Soholle v. State, 90 Mel. 729, 46 A. 320, 50
 1 9 T , R A 8f)8% 3(5 A m 8 t R e p . 9 | 8 / 
T
'
U A
-
 4 I 1
' 10 Santa Clara County v. Southern P. H. 
OTruax v. Corri^an, 257 IT. S. 312, 00 R <\>. H8 IT. «. 394, 30 *R ed. US. 0 S. Ct. 
ed. 254, 42 S. Ct. 12 1, 27 A.RH. 375; Con- H:JO; Sta te v. Montgomery, 94 Me. 192, 47 
noUy v. Sowor Pipe Co. 184 IT. S. 540, 4G A. 105. 80 Am. ^i. Hep 380: Templar y. 
R ed. 079, 22 S. Ct. 431; Cutt ing v. Kansas S ta te Examiners , 131 Mich. 254, 90 N. W. 
City Stock Yards Co. (Cott in^ v. Codard) 1058, 100 Am. St. Hep. 610; State v S tand-
183 IT. S. 79, 40 I , ed. 92, 22 S. Ci. 30;
 { m ] ( ) l l ( < ( ) < (;, ( ) r > 1 3 S , m \\ 40, Ann. Cas. 
Hell's Cap H. Co v. I \ mv-;\ lva nia, 131 TT. S. 1 9 1 1 P> 179 
232 33 H ed 892 10 S Ct 533; Viek Wo 11 H<,one y State, 170 Ala 57. 51 So. 109, 
o l!! )Pl\!;^' l!S ,lI- b ' A^:> 'M\\'' ^ K V T 0 ' . ! 5 Ann. <'"«• Wm\ H>05; Slate v. Nor th -
" " ' " "
 l
 western Rec t i ic Co ls3 Wash 181, 49 P. 
(2d) 8. 101 A I, K ISO. 
S. Ct. 1001; Harhier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 
27, 28 R (Ml 923, 5 S. Ct. 357; Seaboard Air 
lane Pv C<^ \ Simon, 50 Fla 515, 17 So.
 1 M , . ., . . rf, . , , , , , , 0™ 
1001, 20 H K . A ( N S . ) 120, 10 Ann. Cas. * 2 X l ^ l l n \ * ' \ ° ; \ t a L " ^ • < '' V ' ' J " 2 G 0 
1234; Mara lhs v. Chicago, 319 111. 122, 182 Mas, . 225, 157 X. R 051, 53 A P H . K07. 
N. JO. 391, 83 A P U 1222; Cincinnati . II. & 13 Covington & R Turnp Poad Co. v. 
R Pv. Co. v. McCullom, 183 Ind. 550, 109 Sandford, 104 tJ. S. 578, 41 R ed. 500, 17 
N. R 200. Ann. Cas. 191710 1105, aHirmed in *• <'P 198; HeaRan v. Farmer ' s Loan & T. 
245 IT. S. 032, 02 R ed. 521, 28 S. Ct. 04; Co. 154 U. S. 302, 420, 38 R ed. 1011, 1031, 
State v. Uichcreek, 107 Fnd. 217, 77 N. R 1 4 s - Ct- 1047« 1 0 f i 2 -
1085, 5 RH.A.(N.S.) 874, 119 Am. St. }W\). H S ta te v. Cadigan, 73 Vt. 245, 50 A. 1079, 
49, 10 Ann. Cas. 899; Opinion of Just ices , 57 RH.A. 006, 87 Am. St. Rep. 714. 
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property under his control.1 An administrator or executor is not ordinarily 
regarded as the owner of his decedent's real property,2 although in some cir-
cumstances he has been considered as such.3 Various political subdivisions 
have* been held not to be owners within the contemplation of certain statutes 
although the contrary rule has been applied to some such subdivisions in 
different circumstances and under other statutes.4 A life tenant is for some,5 
but not for all, purposes regarded as an owner.6 One having a perpetual lease 
has been held to be an owner,7 but a lessee under a ninety-nine year lease 
may8 or may not be so regarded.9 The term "owner" is frequently used in 
statutes relating1 particularly to matters which form the subject of specific 
articles in this work, and its meaning in such cases is discussed in the partic-
ular article, as illustrated by the references below.10 
§ 40. Incidents of Ownership.—Ownership of property implies the right of 
possession and control thereof11 and includes the right to protect and de-
fend such possession against the intrusion or trespass of others.12 An own-
er's right to the exclusive possession of his property is such that, subject to 
certain conditions, he may be absolved from criminal liability for acts done 
in repelling or ousting an intruder or trespasser.13 80, a landowner may 
enter peaceably on his land and remove therefrom not only a trespasser but 
as well any structure which the trespasser has placed thereon;14 or may, in 
special circumstances, destroy an instrumentality by means of which the in-
trusion or trespass was accomplished.16 As one of its incidents, the own-
ership of property carries with it, at law and in equity, the right to its 
products or increase,16 and the owner, in parting with the use of the land, 
may make such reservation of the products thereof as he chooses.17 Ques-
1 Turner v. Cross, 83 Tex 218, 18 SW 578, et seq.; 30 Am .Tur 317, INTOXICATING I , IQ-
15 \AIA 202. UOKS, § llf>; 30 Am J u r 055, IRRIGATION. § 80; 
Anno: 2 ALU 78 1. 31 Am J u r 053, J intr . § 120; 32 Am Jur , 
2 Dolce v. Denton Countv Lumber Co. 114 I^ANPLOPJ) AND TRNANT, p 30. § 4; p 48, § 25; 
Ark 1, 109 SW 227, 52 LUA(XS) 870; Price l> ^ 4> § 7 r ^ : P G!»r,, § 8J7; 34 Am Jur . LOGS 
v. Ward, 25 Xov 203, 58 V 8 10, 40 LKA 450. AND TIMHER, p 405, §§ 0 8; p 582, § 130; 30 
Anno: 2 J\\J\X 78 4 A m ^ u r 6K, M E ^ H A N I ^ S ' DIENS, § 84; 30 Am 
See 10 Am J u r 780, Di:*n:\T AND DISTET- J U I * ;*K N r i s w r n s , § 33; SPECIAL OR LOCAL 
i u m o \ \ $ 22; 21 Am J u r 541, KxF.rwmii* AND ASSESSMENTS. [Also 25 JLCL w 1KG. 150. 
AI.MIMSIIIAIM:: : , $3 2S0 et serf 1('r>]: TAXATION [Also 20 RCL pp 35S, 350. 
Q / 1 1 ,, , , /x , y - X r i A n 4 1 0 0 4301: TRESI«\SS [Also 20 lU'L pp 055 el soil I. 
3 Chan v Smith Omaha, 8:j Nob 434, 123 
NW 40!, 132 Am St Hop 07O. u ^ recn v. P.hhllo. 8 AYheat.(lTS) 1, 5 L 
Anno* ° \ T 1* 7SI ec^ 511', Judson v. Ree Hive Aulo Serv. Co. 
4 A n n ; r 2 ALR*78l, s. 05 ALR 1088. ' ™ ° l" '• 2 ! ) 7 l> 1 0 r ' ° ' 7 4 A L U < J 4 K 
H I , , , , «~ til rtn 7n A
 r , I2(1.reen v. Riddle, 8 Wheat . (US) 1, 5 L 
f H e - r o v. Chnpnian 2,111 0JO, 70 Am Lee
 0 ( ] f ) j 7 K ( U v n n l , v< S i 2?t2 K v 7 n l < 2 4 
250; ( h i ^ ' i & Co. v. Los Moines, loS Iowa o . V / o , n r . » , , i tmo I»(M . c« t.w.ov v r o m 
A ., * , ; ; ~;\ o- i i i , no7 i<s-> ^ y *M, 225 K W 37, 25 A L U 4<>O; zabow-
Anno: J A J i jM s. Pa ALR 1087.
 k i v * T , o o r i . h f .55 Mich 125, 237 N\V 380, 
s r o 33 Am J u r 4 1,, LIFE ESTATES, R E M A I N -
 r i t | u c \ l u n i o n v . n a v i s , R 2 N l l 304 
PEES, AND Ki:xn:sin.Ns.
 1 > r 3 A ^ 4 f ) A L R H ( ) 9 ; p e o p l c y K a n c m 
CAnno: 2 ARR 785, s. 05 ALR 1087. NY 111, 20 NU 1015, 27 Am St Rep 574; 
7 St. Rernaid v. Kempnor, 00 Ohio St 244, Lyon v. Fai rbank, 70 Wis 455, 48 N\V 402, 
54 KK 207. 45 LRA 002. 24 Am St Rep 732. 
Anno: 2 ALR 781. As to the law of trespass, see TRESPASS 
8 Anno: 2 ALU 784. [Also 20 RCL p 028]. 
9 Smith v. Improvement Lis t . 108 Ark 141, 13 See 4 Am J u r 150, ASSAULT AND BATTERY, 
150 SW 455, 4 1 LRA(NS) 000 §§ 01 et seq; 20 Am Jur , HOMICIDE, p 240, 
Anno: 2*ALR 781. § 124; p 272, §§ 172 et seq. 
10 Seo 11 Am J u r 205, COMATUNMTV RPOP- H Lyon v. Fa i rbank , 70 Wis 455, 48 NW 
i:irn. § 18- 14 Am Jut 81, COFENNNCV, § 8 402. 24 Am St Hop 732. 
(joint t enan t s ) ; p SX, § 17 ( tenants in 15j>ooplo v. Kane. 131 NY 111, 20 NI0 
common) ; 17 Am J u r 707, DRAINS AND S E W - 1015, 27 Am St ]io\) 574. 
EI:S, § 32; IS Am J u r 802, IMMINENT DOMAIN, in I>,,C.I, „ v,,,,.,»,< rr i>„ ,197 <>->
 v ,„ l w 
R* V,o rsi c.^,.. 10 A.« f.... •>.>!! ™,„ ~ iwKush v. \ oUKbt, 55 l»a 437, 03 Am Dee §§ 220 et seq; J8 m Ju r 220, EMOTIONS,
§ 71; 21 Am J u r 170, Kxi:ri"noxs, § 352; 22 
Am Jur 017, FORCIBLE LNTRV AND DETAINEE, S e e 2 A m - , u r 703< ANIMALS, §§ 15, 10; 15 
700. 
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Likewise the b rand or mark on cat t le and the name on the collar worn by a 
<Io«r are admissible on the question of ownership.1 0 Admissions and declara-
t ions may be admi t t ed to prove ownership.1 1 Kxorcisino acts of ownership 
over p rope r ty is the basis for a s t a t u t o r y presumpt ion of ownership in some 
jur isdic t ions . 1 2 Ordinar i ly , ownersh ip of p roper ty is a simple fact, to which 
a witness hav ing the requis i te knowledge can testify directly,1 3 but when 
ownersh ip is a mater ia l fact to be de te rmined in an action, and the answer 
of a wi tness as to ownership involves his construct ion of facts or his con-
clusions as to what they establish, it is e r ror to permit him to testify to the 
u l t imate fact of ownership.1 4 Ownership , when chal lenged, is a lways a mixed 
question of law and fact. If the facts are not in d i spute it becomes a ques-
tion of law for the cour t . If the facts are d isputed the question is left to the 
j u r y unde r proper ins t ruct ions by the cour t upon the law.15 
§ 42. Possession.—Possession is e i ther actual 01* const ruct ive . Proper ly 
speaking , const ruct ive possession is that possession which the law annexes to 
the t i t l e 1 6 It is sometimes called legal possession, or possession in law, to 
dis t inguish it from possession in deed or in fact, which actual occupancy 
gives.17 Actual possession is dis t inguished from the cons t ruct ive possession 
above defined. It means an actual and cont inuous occupancy or exercise of 
full domin ion ; and this may be ei ther , first, an occupancy in fact of the whole 
that is in possession, which is o rd inar i ly called pedis posscssio, and may be 
called subs tant ia l possession,18 or, second, an occupancy of part thereof in 
the name of the whole, where there is sufficient evidence of the bounds of 
the whole that is claimed as one ent i re ty , and the c i rcumstances are such 
that the law extends the possession of the part that is occupied to those 
bounds.1 9 This possession of the whole by occupancy of part is often called 
cons t ruc t ive possession, and the term " a c t u a l " is often confined solely to 
pedis posscssio.20 "Where two persons are in possession, the law adjudges the 
r ightful possessio?i to be in the one who has the r igh t to the laud.1 And 
when one joint owner is in possession of the whole, the presumption is that 
he is keeping possession not only for himself, but for his eotenant , accord-
ing to their several r i g h t s ; and the other joint owner or owners have the 
right so to unde r s t and until they have notice to the cont rary . 2 The mere 
fact of pu t t i ng one's p rope r ty into the charge or cus tody of ano ther does not 
10 IiiRrah.'im v. C h a p m a n , 177 M a s s 123, W i l k e s , 34 S C D (3 S t r o h h ) 405. 51 Am Her 
58 N E 171, 83 A m St R e p 204. 037. 
A n n o : 83 A m St Hop 205; Ann C a s 1015D 18 J a c k s o n v. R o t h s c h i l d (Mo App) 00 S\V 
350. (2d) 859, e i t im; UCL; Racon v. S h e p p a t d . 
As to h r a n d i n s or m a r k i n g a n i m a l s to H NJ R 107. 20 Am Dec 583: M V o l m a n v. 
ev idence o w n e r s h i p , see 2 A m Jur 714-710. W i l k e s , 34 S T L (3 S t i o h h ) 405. 51 A m Dec 
A N I M M S §§ 20-?S 037; Oihson v. St. F'aul b\ & M. Ins . Co. 117 
W Va 150, 181 SJ0 502. oit i im RCL. 
11 See 20 A m J u r 488, EVIDENCE, § 581. One c u l t i v a t i n g and ra i s ing c rops upon 
12 S t a t e ex lei . T i l l m a n v. D i s t r i c t CM. 101 , a n d i s i n .'K'tual possess ion of it, even 
Mont 170, 53 R<2d) 107, 103 AR R 370; J u d - t h o u g h he does not live upon it. C i o s s y. 
son v. Ree H i v e Au to Se rv . Co. 130 Or 1, K n b m s o n , 30 Wyo 302, 250 V 80, 5/ A L U 
9 97 T 1050, 74 ALU 941. >78 
1 Q „ „n . T <•<< i- c n~<> 19 Mor r i son v. Kel ly , 22 111 01 o, 71 A m 
13 bee 20 A m J u r 014, M I D E N C E . § 7,2.
 ] ) 0 f l i n j ) . M V o l m a n v w i l k o s . 31 SCR (3 
14 Poo 20 Am J u r 044, EVIDENCE, § 772. S t r o h h ) 405, 51 Am Dec 037. 
15Jorsev S h o r e T r u s t Co. v. O w o s s o Sav . , *° ^[r^\\ *'}£""*• : U * < 1 M 3 S t r o h h ) 
Hank, 223 Mich 513, 101 N\V 588, 32 AI . i t ' l ("' f>' A m l)oc , , , w -
714 1 Rin/v; v. JM-u-ie. 38 Ala SJ). 70 Am 1 >oe 
82; T i i b M e v Ki. tme, 7 .).) M a i s h . ( K \ ) 5<M>, 
16 H a n i s v. Taul , 37 Ohio A p p 2'»0, 171
 :»:. A i n j > o r u><) MnRior v. Tr ini tx (Munch. 
N E 015, c i t i ng l U ' L .
 :» S o l ^ & u ( P a ) 50!). 8 Am D(*v 003 
17 M o r r i s o n v. Kelly, 22 111 C10, 74 Am Dec 2 Uolloy v. J l a u l e y , 30 Vt 525, 0 1 Am Dec 
1G9; J a c k s o n v. R o t h s c h i l d (Mo App) 00 350. 
S W ( 2 d ) 859, c i t i n g R C L ; M ' C o l m a n v. See 14 A m J u r 04, COTENANCY, § 23. 
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not confer power to control r igh t s which are pure ly and exclusively pr iva te , 
bu t it does author ize the es tabl ishment of laws requ i r ing each citizen so to 
conduct himself and use his own p r o p e r t y as not unnecessar i ly to injure an-
other . This is the very essence of government . 1 This power of government — 
commonly called the police power—is essential , and, as well, very grea t and 
comprehensive in its extent . 2 The scope and ex ten t of the police power over 
p rope r ly and r igh t s therein, and the subjects of p rope r ty and p rope r ty r igh t s 
on which such power may be exercised within const i tut ional l imita t ions , do 
not pe rmi t of discussion, or even enumera t ion , here. Moreover, they a re 
discussed elsewhere.3 
The s ta te may prov ide regu la t ions as to the acquisit ion, enjoyment , and 
disposition of p roper ty . 4 The power ex tends to in tangible , as well as to tan-
gible, p roper ly . 5 However , since the r igh t of p rope r ty is a fundamental r ight , 
its pro tec t ion , as well as its use, is one of the most, impor tan t objects of 
government , 0 a l imita t ion imposed u n d e r this power wi thout reason or neces-
sity cannot be enforced; 7 and in the exercise of it, the s ta te cannot prohib i t 
a l toge ther any person wha teve r from legally acqui r ing and possessing prop-
er ly general ly , or any pa r t i cu l a r species or descr ip t ion of p roper ty . 8 Nor 
can an owner be depr ived , even by s t a tu te , of the legi t imate use of his p rop-
er ty because it may cause a real damage to his neighbor.9 The s ta te can, 
howe \e r , wi th in cons t i tu t ional l imita t ions , not only regu la te the acquisi t ion, 
enjoyment , and disposi t ion of p roper ty , but as all p r o p e r l y is held subject 
to the lawful demand of the sovereign, it may also take pr iva te p rope r ty for 
a public purpose , subject , of course, to the r i gh t of the individuals to jus t 
compensat ion therefor .1 0 
As s ta ted above, land has an indefinite ex ten t , d o w n w a r d s to the center 
of the ear th and u p w a r d s from the surface to the highest heavens.1 1 And 
the cour ts cannot l imit the extent , up or down, to which a man may enjoy 
his p r o p e r t y ; and if he goes h igher than his neighbor, so long as he does not 
interfere with 1he r ights of others , or in jure his neighbor, he subjects himself 
to no liability.12 i lis r ights in this respect can be modified or res t r ic ted only 
by the l awmaking power , in the exercise of the police power or the power 
of eminent domain.1 3 Kapid ly chang ing condi t ions of modern life have re-
i M u n n v. I l l inois , 94 U S 113, 24 L ed 
77; Des M o i n e s v. M a n h a t t a n Oil Co. 193 
Iowa 101)0, 181 N W 823, 188 N\V 921, 23 A L U 
1322; S l a t e ex i el. lOucl id-Doan Hldg. Co. v. 
C u n n i n g h a m . 97 Ohio S t 130, 119 NK) 3G1, 
LRAl iHSU 7H(). 
2 S t a t e v. Yopp, 97 N C 477, 2 S E 458, 2 
Am S t R e p 305. 
In X e h b i a v. N e w York . 291 U S 502, 78 
L ed 940, 51 S Ct 505. 89 AT,It 14G9, a p a r t i a l 
list of tire e a s e s in wh ich the S u p r e m e C o u r t 
h a s c o n s i d e i e d a n d s u s t a i n e d the exe rc i s e 
of t h e p o w e r by the s t a t e s is c i ted . 
3 See 11 A m J u r , CONSTITUTIONAL L A W , p 
966, §§ 245 et «*e<r. p 1009, §§ 2G8, 2G9. 
4 W e s t e r n U. T e l e s . Co. v. N e w York U V ) 
38 P r>5.\ 3 LILY H (); McDan ie l v. M c M h v , 
91 l"l;i 770, ins Si. V 0 , ni ALU 731; Sch i l l e r 
P iano Co v Il l inois N o i t h e r n Ut i l i t ies Co. 
2SS 111 580, \r\ NK (i:U, 11 A L U -151; S t e v e n s 
v. S t a l e , 2 Aik 2(H . 35 Am Dee 72; He (Jill, 
79 Iowa 290, 44 X W 553, 9 LKA 120; S t a t e 
v. T a lk , 42 Nov 2S0, 178 P 389, 3 A L U 75. 
5 S e c u r i t y S a w B a n k v. Cal i forn ia , 203 US 
282, 08 U ed 301, 44 S C t 108, 31 A L U 391. 
6 Schi l le r P i a n o Co. v. I l l inois N o r t h e r n 
Ut i l i t i e s Co. 288 111 580, 123 N K 031, 11 A L U 
451. 
7 W a ^ h i n ^ t o n ox rel . S e a t t l e T i t l e T r u s t 
Co. v. ItobeiKO, 278 U S 110, 73 L ed 210, 49 S 
Ct 50, 80 A L U 054; C u r r a n Hill P o s t i n g & 
D i s h Unit ing Co. v. Denver , 47 Colo 221, 107 
P 201, 27 L R A ( N S ) 514; C r a w t o i d v. T o -
peka , 51 K a n 750, 33 P 470, 20 LKA 092, 37 
A m S t H e p 323; S p a n n v. P a l l a s , 111 T e x 
350, 225 S\V 513, 19 A L U 1387. 
8 S t e v e n s v. S t a t e , 2 Ark 291, 35 Am Dec 
72; S t a t e v. P a r k , 42 Nov 380, 178 P 389, 3 
A L U 75. 
9 r u t i n s Oil & Fue l Co. v. U u a r a n t y Oil. 
Co. 1 15 Lo 233, 82 So 200, 5 A L U 411. 
10 Lciral T e n d e r C a s e s 12 Wal l ( U S ) 457, 
20 L oil 287; People v P a n i e K 0 Utah 2X8, 
1!J P 159, 5 LHA 444, exp la ined in Kimba l l 
v (!i i n t s U U o City. 19 Utah 30S, :{«iS. 57 P 1. 
4f. LKA 028. 
So" 18 A m Jm 021, K A I I N K N I 1 D O M M N 
11 See s u p i a , §5 14, 15. 
12 Detro i t P a s e Pal l C lub v. Depper t , 01 
Mich 03, 27 N W 850, I Am St Hep 500. 
13 C h r i s t e n s c n v. M a n n , 187 W i s 507, 204 
N W 499, 41 A L U 1192. 
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le^al action by officers would not Jong go unchal lenged, 1 2 the inconvenience and 
pre judice which would result From chang ing set t led construct ions, 1 3 and the 
implied vonsrni o)' the leg is la ture in not chang ing a pj-ovi.sion of Jaw which has 
received a long-sett led construct ion. 1 4 
A construct ion of doubtful correctness may be sustained,1 5 bu t one mani-
festly wrong, or clearly erroneous, cannot be upheld.1 6 
§ 79. — W h a t Const i tu tes Cons t ruc t ion .—Prac t ica l construct ion, as distin-
guished from judicial const ruct ion, is the in te rp re ta t ion put upon s ta tu tes 
made for the regulat ion of the different d e p a r t m e n t s of the government by 
the actual adminis t ra t ion of them by such depar tments . 1 7 An actual construc-
tion is essential1 8 to invoke the rule t h a t the cour ts will give weight to a 
pract ica l construct ion by admin i s t ra t ive au thor i t ies in de te rmin ing the true 
mean ing of a s ta tu te . 1 9 It is what is done r a t h e r than what is said t ha t es-
tabl ishes an admin i s t ra t ive construct ion.2 0 An admin is t ra t ive opinion in a 
-- U s —, 80 F od (Adv. 205), 02 S CI 425. 
A n n o : 73 P ed 338, s. 84 P od 39. 
12 Uni ted S u i t e s v. Midwes t Oil Co. 230 
r s uo. 50 (, od <;73. 35 s ct 200. 
Anno- 73 F od .T}8. ^ HI L ed 30. 
13 N e w Ynrl., C. & St . L R. Co. v. F r a n k . 
- rs . v/,1 L ,»cj <A<}\- (J<>~), rrj s ct I'S.v,-
( J rand Ti nnJc W'o^toi n P . Co. v. Uni t ed 
S l a t e - . 252 lTS 112. 01 I, ed 481. 40 S Ct 
200; Kb ,d i ed v. I 'n inn I \ P Co 225 US 
58J, :,(! F ed 12ir,. 32 S Ct 7X0; Cnilo. l 
S t a t e s v. IInniuoi<;. 2 .'I t ' S 22«>. :~5 F ed 
Tin, ;n S CI vr»,: Hewi t t v SehuHz . I 8n U S 
12,0. 15 F (>d 102. 21 ^ Ct 309; Uni ted S t a l e s 
v. A l a b a m a C. S 11. Co. 1 12 U S 015, 3.", F od 
1131. 12 S Ct 300- IVtuiMvor v McCon-
nanu l iv . 1 in U S 1 25 U od 302. 11 S Ct 000; 
Iron S i lver Mia. c n . v. E lg in Min. & S m e l l -
ing Co. US US l^n. 30 P ed 08. 0 S Ct 1 1TT -
A r n o t t v. S t a l e . FH Ind 18a. su X E 153, 8 
F P A C \ T S ) n«»j : .Miller- In^. Agcney v 
r m l n . 02. Mont 507. 2'» PCM) 013. c i t ing 
P C F ; UnilroMl C u i i m i i ^ i u n v. P< d A r r o w 
F io iuh t Fino^ (Tex Civ A p p ) 00 S W ( 2 d ; 
,".;" c i t ing p e p 
A n n o : T3 F od 335. s. SI F od 30. 
An a d m i n i s t r a t i v e p r a c t i c e is of spec ia l 
w e i g h t in c o n s t r u i n g n s t a t u t e when r e l F 
.'incc l ias boon plaoed on tho p rae t i eo by 
IIKINO Mfeoto l hy it. San fo rd v. C o m m i s -
s ione r oi Inlet nal Povonuo , 308 US 30, 8 1 
U ed 20. 00 S ' T 5 1. r e h e a r i n g denied in 
2,08 U S 03 7 >U U ed r.J'J. 00 S Ct 258. 
Contemporaneous and practice) construc-
tion put upon a s t a t u t e hy e x e c u t i v e otlioers 
will not l»o r e so r t ed lo in a id of the i n t e r -
p r e t a t i o n of such s t a t u t e , u n l e s s tho eon 
Mrue t ion involved is one of doubt , and 
t hose to be affected h a v e relied on the p r a c -
t ical c o n s t r u c t i o n , a n d r i g h t s h a v e a c c r u e d 
bv r e a s o n of such r e l i ance . S t u d e b a k e r v 
F e r r y . 18 1 US 258. 40 U ed 528, 22 S Ct H»3 
H U c l v e r i n g v. AYinmill, 305 U S 70, 83 
F ed 5 \ 50 S Ct 15 ( T i o a s u r y P o p u l a t i o n s 
and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of r e v e n u e l a w s ) ; N o r -
weg ian N i t rogen F r o d u c t s Co. v. Uni ted 
S t a t e s , 288 US 20 1, 77 F ed 700, 53 S Ct 
350. C o s t a u z o v. T i l l i n g h a s t , 287 U S 311, 
77 F ed 250, 53 S Ct 152; Uni t ed S t a t e s v 
S h r o v e p o r t C r a i n & E l e v a t o r Co. 287 U S 
77, 77 J. od 175, 53 S Ct 42; U n i t e d S t a t e s 
*\ F a r n r , 281 US 024. 74 P ed 1078, 50 S Ct 
425, 08 A F P 802; Uni ted S t a t e s v. J a c k s o n , 
?<?n TTS 183 Tl L od 301. 50 S Ct 143; P o c k e t 
403, G4 A L R 1431; U n i t e d S t a t e s v. Chicago, 
S t P . & M. O. 11. Co. (CCA 8th) 43 Ft 2d) 
.100, 71 ALU 507; Uni ted Facific Ins. Co. v. 
F a k e s , 57 Idaho 537. 07 F(2d) 102 1. oiting 
I tCU; Miller Ins. Agency v. Por te r . 03 Mont 
507. 20 F (2d ) 0 13. c i t ing P C F ; Van J >\ ko's 
Appea l , 217 Wis 528, 250 X YV 700, 08 ALU 
f.'?.')2; S ( a t e ex rof. Cross v. F a n d Oommis -
s ioners , 50 Wvo J8t , 58 P(2d) 423, 02 P(2d) 
510 c i t ing P C F . 
A n n o : 73 P ed 338, s. 8 1 F od 40. 
A c q u i e s c e n c e by C o n g r e s s in an a d m i n -
i s t r a t e e p r a c t i c e may ho an in fe rence from 
si lonco d u r i n g a poi iod of y e a r s . No iwe-
g ian N i l i o g o n P r o d u c t s Co. v. United 
S t a t e s , 288 US 20 1. 77 L ed 700. 53 S Ct 350. 
F a i l u r e of C o n g r e s s to a l t e r a s t a t u t e 
c r e a t e s a p i e s u m p t i o n in favor of i ts con-
s i s t e n t a d m i n i s t r a t i v e in te i p r e t a t i o n for a 
n u m b e r of y e a r s by Die d e p a r t m e n t charged 
wi th its e n f o r c e m e n t , to which g r e a t weight 
shou ld ho Riven even t h o u g h the co r rec t -
n e s s of s u c h intei pi o ta t ion is doubtful . 
C o s b m z o v. T i l b n g h a s t , 287 US 241, 77 U ed 
2,50 r,:t S CI F52. 
I S C o s t a n z o v. T i l l i nghas t , 287 U S 341. 77 
F ed 350. 53 S Ct 152; Un i t ed S t a t e s v. 
F inne l l , 3 85 U S 230, 4G P ed 800, 22 S Ct 
033. 
Sco a lso ea se s t h r o u g h o u t th i s sec t ion . 
A n n o : 73 F ed 352. s. 8 1 F ed 51. 
If d e p a r t m e n t a l c o n s t r u c t i o n of a s t a t u t e 
is obvious ly or c lear ly w r o n g , il is the duty 
(d* the S u p r e m o Cour t to so a d j u d g e , but if 
t h e r e s i m p l y is d o u b t a s to tho s o u n d n e s s 
of that c o n s t r u c t i o n t he ac t i on d u r i n g many 
y e a r s of t he d e p a r t m e n t c h a r g e d w i th tho 
execu t ion of the s t a t u t e should be r e spec t -
ed ,ui<l no t ove r ru l ed except for cogent 
r e a s o n s . U n i t e d S t a l e s v. Finnel l , 185 US 
230, 40 F od 800, 22 S Ct 033. 
16 See infra . § 82. 
i f P d o x h a i u v. C o n s u m e r s ' E l e c t r i c F igh t 
& S t i e e t IF Co. 30 Fla 519, 18 So 411. 29 
F R A 507, 51 Am St P o p 41. 
18 A n n o : 73 F ed 349, s. 84 F od 50. 
19 See s u p i n . § 78. 
20 A n n o : 84 F ed 30. 
T h e force of a c o n s t r u c t i o n of a l aw by 
the S e c r e t a r y of the Infer ior t h a t is r igh t 
in e s s e n c e is not lessoned by a n y t h i n g he 
m a y h a v e sa id concerning: wdiat w a s not 
JUDICIAL SALES 31 Am Jur 
§ 11. Jurisdiction under Statute.—If the jurisdiction to order or conduct a 
judicial sale is conferred or limited by s tatute , part icularly if it is a special 
jurisdiction or power to sell, the provisions of the s ta tu te must be strictly fol-
lowed, and the sale is void if ordered, conducted, or confirmed in a manner 
or upon terms other than those prescribed thereby.9 Thus, under a statute 
empowering courts of equity jurisdiction to order a sale of property owned 
by two or more persons jointly or in common when in the court 's opinion the 
sale will bet ter promote the interests of the owners, the court is not author-
ized to direct a sale of such property to pay debts, for no person who is not 
interested in the property as owner is entitled to the benefit of the statute.10 
Again, under a s ta tute enabling a court of equity to decree a sale of property 
held subject to remainders where all the part ies in interest and in being who 
would be entitled thereto, if the contingency had happened at the date of the 
decree, are parties, and the sale appears to be advantageous to all concerned, 
jurisdiction to sell is said to rest upon the concurrence of these terms at the 
date of the decree as conditions precedent ; wherefore the court was without 
jurisdiction under the act to pass a decree permit t ing a testamentary trustee 
to make future sales of ground rents held by him subject to contingent re-
mainders under a will which expressly forbids such a sale during the continu-
ance of the trust.1 1 
§ 12. Inception and Duration of Jurisdiction.—As is subsequently noted, 
jurisdiction over the subject mat ter ordinari ly is conferred by the filing of a 
petition, bill, or other proper pleading,12 and when the pleadings show an 
appropr ia te case for the exercise by (he court of its prerogative ty issue its 
decree for the sale of property, no errors, irregularities, or even fraud in the 
subsequent proceedings can oust the court of its jurisdiction thus acquired.13 
Jurisdict ion once acquired extends until the mat te r has been finally disposed 
of.14 Moreover, in a proceeding to sell land, a court of equity has all the 
powers necessary to accomplish its purpose, and when relief can be given in 
the pending action, it must be done by a motion in the cause, and not by an 
independent action. The lat ter is allowed only where the mat ter has been 
101, 33 S Ct 64; J e n n i n g s v. Carson, 4 
Cranch (US) 2, 2 D p<l 531 • Ga< in \ O n tin, 
171 111 OH). 19 NR 523, 40 LRA 770; Cochran 
v. Van Sur lav , 20 Wend (XV) 305 p> \?n 
Dor 570; S t a t e ox rol. Rober t son v. Bank 
of Dristol. 1G5 Tonn 351. 54 SW(2d) 967, 
oitimr RCD. 
Where a cour t of eaui ty , upon a c redi tor ' s 
bill, find*; t h a t cer ta in p a t e n t s and o the r 
p rope r ty were, by the agi cement of the 
par t ies , to be sold and, af ter paying" the 
plaintiff his advances , the net proceeds 
were to lie divided between the plaintiff and 
(he defendant it mav require the d^fn-i la-it 
to t i a n s f e r tho pa t en t s to a leceivnr and 
direct the l a t t e r to sell them, and may, 
wi thou t commi t t i ng icvM^ible ci mr . refuse 
tho reques t of tho defendant t ha t in caso 
ho should within a reasonable time, prw all 
s u m s found due the plaintiff, and all costs 
and expenses t ha t then the receiver should 
not soli the patent*5 and should convoy one 
half thoroof to the defendant and the o ther 
to tho plaintiff Vail v Hammond , 00 Conn 
371 "2 A 954 25 Am St Rep 330 
9 Gibson v. Lvon, 115 US 439. 29 L ed 440. 
G S Ct 129; Gaines v De la Croix, 6 Wal l . 
(V^) 719, IS I. ed 905: Ea r lv v Doe. 10 
How (US) 610. 14 I, ed 1079: E rwin v. 
I .owry, 7 How (\1^) 172, 12 I, ed 055: 
Jolliffe v. Crawford. 70 Ind App 282, 132 NE 
300, c i t ing RCL. 
10 Vail v. H a m m o n d . 00 Conn 374. 22 A 
95 J. 25 Am St Rep 330. See also Shr iver 
y. J.ynn. 2 How (lTS1 43. 11 L ed 172. hold-
ing t ha t the chancel lor could order a sale 
under a special s t a t u t e onlv upon the ap -
plication of persons in teres ted . 
11 Ball v. Safe Deposi t & T. Co. 92 Md 
503. 4$ A 155, 52 LRA 403. 
12 See infra, § 10. 
13 Vollum v. Reall, 117 Md 617, 83 A 1095, 
Ann Cas 1914D 16; H u n t e r v. Hat ton , 4 Gill 
(Md) 115. 45 Am Dec 117; Atk ins v Kin-
nan, 20 AVond (NY) 241, 32 Am Dec 531 
As to the effect of i r regular i ty , error, or 
fraud general lv , see infra, § 28. 
H Toolev v. Gridlov, 3 Smetfes- £ M. 
(Mis<0# 493, 41 Am Dec 02S. 
A tr ial judge in equity proceedings exer-
cising a u t h o r i t y over the sale of property 
in tho control of the com t has discret ion-
a ry Dower to modify all o rders affecting 
such sale by subsequen t orders . Re Great 
Wes t e rn Beet S u g a r Co. 22 Idaho 328, 125 P 
799, 43 L R A ( N S ) 671. 
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§ 52. Use and Development of Premises.—A lessee in a mining lease has a 
r ight to explore and extract the minerals tha t may be in the land and to do 
all things reasonably necessary to tha t end, such as the construction of fa-
cilities and s t ructures required for the purpose.4 A lease of land, without men-
tioning mines, will entitle the lessee to work open, but not unopened, mines. 
If there are open mines, a lease of land with the mines therein will not extend 
to unopened mines; but if there are no open mines, a lease of land, together 
with all mines therein, will enable the lessee to open new mines.6 Duties and re-
quirements as to exploring, working, and developing the leasehold may be im-
posed upon the lessee by Die terms of the lease.6 Similar provisions are found 
in gas and oil leases,7 and although a distinction is sometimes made between 
the two classes of leases in regard to this matter ,8 the courts generally treat 
them alike and apply the same principles in dealing with them.9 Covenants 
to explore or work the premises are sometimes express,10 and where tha t is the 
cnse, no implied covenant exists as to the same matter.1 1 But in the absence 
of an express covenant in the lease requir ing the lessee to work and develop 
the-leasehold, a duty to do so may be implied.12 There is a difference in this 
respect between leases reserving a royal ty in the product of the mine and 
leases for which a valuable consideration is paid at the time of their execu-
tion.13 There may be no implied covenant to develop and mine the leasehold 
where the consideration for the lease is received in advance,14 part icularly 
where the situation of the proper ly and other conditions negative such a co\e-
nant.15 But when the lease rcquires ' the payment of a royalty on the product 
mined, there is a fair implication that the lessee shall develop and operate the 
premises for the mutual benefit of himself and the lessor,16 and this implied 
4 S t a l e v . I l o v a l M i n e r a l A s s o . 132 M i n n 10 F r e e p o r t S u l p h u r C o . v. A m e i i c a n 
232, 156 N W 128, A n n C:is 1918A 145. S u l p h u r R o y a l t y Co . 117 T e x 43!), 6 S W ( 2 d ) 
A n n o : 48 L R A ( N S ) 888. 1039, 60 A L U 890. 
H o u s e s f o r t h e a c c o m m o d a t i o n of t h e n F r e e p o r t S u l p h u r C o . v. A m e r i c a n S u l -
e m p l o y e e s m a y h e e r e c t e d on t h e s u r f a c e
 p h u r R o y a l t y Co . 117 T e x 439, G S \ V ( 2 d ) 
b y t h e l e s s e e , a n d s u c h h o u s e s m a y b e 1039, 60 A L I I 890. 
l e a s e d t o s t r a n g e r s u n t i l i t b e c o m e s n e c e s - A n n o : 60 A L i t 908. 
s a r y t o u s e t h e m for t h e e m p l o y e e s of t h e 
m i n e . S t o n e g a p C o l l i e r y Co . v.. K e l l y & 1 2 I l i l l e r v. H a y , 59 F l a 285, 52 S o 623, 20 
V i c a r s , 115 V a 390, 79 S E 341, 48 L R A ( N S ) A n n C a s 1162; E a s t e r n K e n t u c k y M i u e i a l 
8<n & T i m b e r Co . v. S w a n n - D a y L u m b e r Co 
5 S a u n d e t s ' C a s e , 5 C o k e 12a, 77 K n R H i - f l « * * 8 2 ' * 4 G S W « ? ' ** I . U A ( N S ) i G72: 
p u n t iUh 1 L r o w n l & C, 241, 123 K „ g k o , ^ e n *;L v . D e l a x u i r e & 11. C a n a l Co Uu \ \ 
p r i n t 778, C r o E l i z p t . 2, p . 633, 78 E n s l i e - ™*> S2™1\ ™'\™*1jll$ ££i<?olreK T , l " ! 
p r i n t 919; 17 E n g Uul ( ' a s 723; C l e 8 K v. , C ° ' ^ J . ™ * ' V * ^ 2 S , K ^ V ' <>U\?« 
R o w H n d , L R 2 E q 1 GO. 17 E n * Kill C a s 725 f^^fii" fZ r'n VrT^' ' 3 U X a ( , & 8 ' 
8 C h e r o k e e C o n s t r . C o . v. B i s h o p , 86 A r k 8 1 A „ " . % n AT n o ^ . T T7 A i n i r r . m «n 
489, 112 S W 189, 126 A m S t R e p 1098; Z e l -
 A
 A n
"
o :
 -
G
°
 A L R 9 0 1 ; T
^ A 1 9 1 5 B 5 6 1 : 20 
l o k e n v. L y n c h , 80 K a n 716, 104 V 563, 46 A n n C a s 1 U > 7 -
L K A ( N S ) 659; E a s t e r n K e n t u c k y M i n e r a l & 13 A n n o : 60 A L U 930; L R A 1 9 1 5 B 561. 
T i m h e r Co. v. S w a n n - D n v L u m b e r Co . 148 , . 
K v 82, 146 S W 438. 46 L U A ( N S ) 672; C,enot " C h a n d l e r v. JTa i t . 161 C a l 405, 11') P 
v ' D e l a w a r e & Tl C a n a l Co . 136 N Y 593, 32 n i n > A n n C a s 1913B 1091 ; M i n e i a l L a n d Tn-
N E 1078, 19 L U A 127; Fi< onoi t S u l p h u r v e s t . Co . v . L i s h o p I r o n C o . 134 M i n n 112, 
Co v. A m e r i c a n S u l p h u r R o v a l t v Co 117 150 N W 966, L K U 9 1 7 D 900. 
TVx 439, 6 S W ( 2 d ) 1039, 60 A L R 890: A n n o : 60 A L U 930. 
l l o i e r I r o n Co . v. T i o u t , 83 V a 397, 2 S E 15 M i n e r a l L a n d I n v e s t Co v B i s h o p 
713, 5 A m S t R e p 2S5; C h a n d l e r v. F i e t i e h ,
 T r o n C o n i u h m 4 1 2 1 5 J ) N W dQC) L R A 
73 W V a 658, 81 S E 825, L R A 1 9 1 5 E 5 6 1 ;
 m 7 D 9 0 0 > w h o r e i n n o c o v e n a n t v , a* i m -
L o ^ l a n d v L o n ^ h e m v , 115 W i s GO, 129
 p l l e ( 1 ^ j l o r o t h e l a n d w a s i e m o t e , p a t e n t s 
N W 650, 140 A m S t Ttep 1068.
 h a d n o t y e t i^H110d, a n d t h e i e w a s no t i a n s -
A n n o : 60 A L U 9 0 1 ; 20 A n n C a s 1166; p o i t a t i o n f a c i l i t i e s . 
A n n C a s 191713 1123. A n n o : 60 A L I I 916. 
7 S o o 24 A m J u r 561, G A S AND O I L , § § 5 8
 w R o r e r I r o n C o y TvouU g 3 V f l 3 q ? 2 
a .?' „ T. , nn ,<r ,r n r o o« S E 7 1 3 ' 5 A m S t K ° 0 2 8 5 ' Chandler V. 
8 C h a n d l e r v. F r e n c h , 73 W V a 658, 81 F r e n c h , 73 W V a 658, 81 S E 825 L R A 
S E 825, L U A 1 9 1 5 L 561 . 1915[>, 561. 
A n n o : A n n C a s 1917E 1123. A n n o : 60 A L U 9 0 1 ; LRA1915P> 5 6 1 ; 20 
9 A n n o : A n n C a s 1917E 1123. A n n C a s 1167; A n n C a s 1917E 1126 
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in quantities justifying development,11 and the marking of the boundaries 
on the ground,12 many of the mining states have imposed additional require-
ments,13 such as the sinking of a discovery shaft,14 the posting oC a pre-emp-
tive notice,15 and the recordation of a declaration or certificate of location.16 
As pointed out heretofore,17 the miners of the several mining districts are 
authorized to prescribe further regulations not inconsistent with statute.18 
It is clear, of course, that the validity of a location depends upon compli-
ance with the statutes.19 The law requires that the locator shall act in good 
faith,20 and it will not countenance a trespass1 or a fraud2 as the basis of a 
mining right. 
In a proper case, it may be presumed that a location was regularly made.3 
§ 78. Rights pending Location.—"While completion of a location is essential 
to give an explorer on the public mineral lands any vested rights as against 
the United States,4 this does not mean that a person seeking to locate a claim 
thereon is without protection against third persons pending performance of 
the several acts already discussed; for so long as he remains in actual occu-
pation and continues to search diligently for the necessary mineral,6 the law, 
regarding him ns a licensee or a tenant at will,6 accords him its protection 
against any forcible, fraudulent, or clandestine intrusion7 upon the area so 
11 Cole v. Ra lph , 252 US 286, f>4 L ed 567, 
40 S Ct 321. 
See also infra, §§ 83 et seep 
12 Cole v. Ralph . 252 U S 208. 04 L ed 507. 
40 S Ct 321; H a m m e r v. Garfield Min. & 
Mill. Co. 130 US 2!U, 32 J, ed 961. 9 S Ct 
548; Risch v. W i - e m a n , 36 Or 484, 59 P 
1111, 78 Am St Rep 7S3. 
See also infra, §§ 89 et seq. 
13 Creede & C. C. Min. & Mill. Co. v. 
Uinta Tunne l Min. & T r a n s p . Co. 196 US 
337, 49 L ed 501, 25 S Ct 266; B u t t e City 
W a t e r Co. v. Raker , 196 US 119, 49 L ed 
409, 25 S Ct 211. 
A n n o : 7 L R A ( N S ) 776. 
Congress has not made detai led provi-
sion in tespeet of (he m a n n e r in which tho 
location shal l he made . Del Monte Min. & 
Mill. Co. v. Las t Chance Min. & Mill. Co. 
171 US 55, 43 L ed 72, 18 S Ct 895. 
A s t a t e law prescr ib ing p re requ i s i t e s to 
the location of a min ing claim is ohl iga-
tory upon those des i r ing to secure min ing 
c la ims wi th in the s t a t e . Dwinnell v. Dyer, 
145 Cal 12, 78 1' 247, 7 L R A ( N S ) 763. 
14 See infra, § 88. 
1& See infra, § 79. 
16 See infra, §§ 95 et seq. 
17 See supra , § 7 6. 
18 30 USCA § 2 8. 
Dawson v. United S l a t e s Min. Co. 207 US 
1 52 D ed 65, 28 S Ct 15;Kendal l v. San 
J u a n Si lver Min Co. 144 US 658, 36 D ed 
583, 12 S Ct 779; ( U n d e r Mounta in Si lver 
Min. Co. v Will is . 127 US 471, 32 D ed 172, 
8 S Ct 1214; Ma Hot t v. Uncle Sam Cold & 
S Min. Co 1 Nov 188, 90 Am Dec 481. 
Anno : 7 L R A ( N S ) 776. 
Pr ior to e n a c t m e n t of the mining s t a t -
utes , a claim could ho validly located only 
in acco rdance with the mine r s ' rules . 
A n n o : 7 D R A ( N S ) 769. 
19 Hoik v. Meagher , 104 US 279, 26 D ed 
735; United S t a t e s v. Cast i l lero, 2 Black 
(US) 17, 17 L ed 360. 
Anno : 7 L K A ( N S ) 884. 
20 Char l ton v. Kelly (CCA 9th) 156 F 433. 
13 Ann Cas 518. 
1 E r h a r d t v. Roaro, 113 US 527, 28 L ed 
1113, 5 S Ct 560; McLemore v. Expres s oi l 
Co. 158 Cal 559, 112 R 59, 139 Am St Kop 
147; Carvey v. Elder , 21 SD 77, 109 N\V 
508. 130 Am St Rep 704; W h i t i n g v. S t ra . ip . 
17 YVyo 1, 95 P 849, 129 Am St Rep 1093. 
2 McLemore v. E x p r e s s Oil Co. 158 Cal 
559, 112 P 59, 139 Am St Rep 147. 
3 Buffalo Zinc & Copper Co. v. Crump. 
70 Ark 525, 69 S W 572, 91 Am St Rep 8T; 
Engl i sh v. Johnson , 17 Cal 107, 76 Am Dec 
574. 
4 S p a r k s v. P ierce . 115 US 408, 29 L ed 
428, 6 S Ct 102; J a c k s o n v. Rohv, 109 US 
4 10, 27 L ed 990, 3 S Ct 301; McLemore v. 
E x p r e s s Oil Co. 158 Cal 559, 112 P 59, 139 
Am St Rep 147. 
5 Cole v. Ra lph , 252 US 286, 64 I, ed 567, 
40 S Ct 321; Union Oil Co. v. Smith , 219 US 
337, 63 L ed 635, 39 S Ct 308; McLemore v. 
E x p r e s s Oil Co. 158 Cal 559, 112 P 59, 139 
Am St Rep 147; Engl i sh v. Johnson , 17 
Cal 107, 76 Am Dec 574; O m a r v. Soper, 11 
Colo 380, 18 P 443, 7 Am St Rep 246; W h i t -
ing v. S t r aup , 17 Wyo I, 95 P 849, 129 Am 
St Rep 1093. 
Anno : 139 Am St Rep 185 et seq. 
Possession of a mining claim is notice 
to all the world of the possessor ' s r igh t s 
the reunder . R u t t e & S. Copper Co. v. 
C l a r k - M o n t a n a Rea l ty Co. 249 US 12, 63 L 
ed 4 47, 39 S Ct 231. 
The possession need not, however, be evi-
denced by an ac tua l enclosure . Engl i sh v. 
Johnson , 17 Cal 107, 76 Am Dec 574. 
6 Cole v. Ralph, 252 US 286, 61 L ed 567, 
40 S Ct 321. 
A qualified person who en te rs upon the 
public domain for exp lora tory pui poses is 
a l icensee or t e n a n t a t will, and not a t r es -
passer . Union Oil Co. v. Smith , 249 US 
337, 63 L ed 635, 39 S Ct 308. 
7 Cole v. Ralph, 252 U S 286, 64 L ed 567, 
40 S Ct 321; Union Oil Co. v. Smith , 249 US 
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i( is clear that tlie Federal s ta tute is satisfied by any marking thai enables 
the boundaries of the claim 1o be readily traced.5 Thus, although monuments 
of a more permanent character are probably preferable, the courts agree that 
a series of stakes driven into the ground may suffice.6 
While the law does not contemplate that the locator shall proceed with 
technical accuracy in the matter,7 it must be kept in mind that the monuments 
and markings on the ground control the courses and distances,8 and tha t the 
locator is required to stand on his claim as he laid it out, for the courts are 
powerless to relocate it for him.9 
A tunnel operator is not required to mark the boundaries of a vein that 
he has encountered in the course of his excavation,10 although such marking 
is essential to the validity of any surface location that he may make.11 
§ 90. Lode Claims.—While the size and extent of lode claims acquired prior 
to May 10, 1872, were governed by the customs, regulations, and laws in force 
when they were located,12 the s ta tute of that date declares that all other 
claims of such character "may equal, but shall not exceed, one thousand five 
hundred feet in length along the vein or lode," with the proviso that "no claim 
shall extend more than three hundred feet on each side of the middle of the 
vein at the surface, nor shall any claim be limited by any mining regulation to 
less than twenty-five feet on each side of the middle of the vein at the sur-
face, except where adverse r ights existing on the 10th day of May, 1872, 
render such limitation necessary. The end lines of each claim shall be paral-
lel to each other."13 
This enactment undoubtedly contemplates tha t the locator shall first deter-
mine the course of the vein, either by surface outcrops or by subsurface ex-
way to make his location correspond there- mining claim. Creede & C. O. Min. & Mill, 
to. Del Monte Min. & Mill. Co. v. Last Co. v. Uinta Tunnel Min. & Transp. Co. 
Chance Min. & Mill. Co. 171 US 55, 43 L J0C US 337, 49 L ed 501, 25 S Ct 2G6. 
ed 72, 18 S Ct 895.
 1 2 ^ U S C A ^ , n 
5 Haws v. Victoria Copper Min. Co. 160 Anno: 7 LRA(NS) 769, 812 et sen., s. 28 
US 303, 40 L ed 436, 16 S Ct 282; Charlton LUA(NS) 10°9 
y Kelly (CCA 9th) 150 U 433. 13 Ann Cas
 T h e A c t 0f 1 8 5 6 p r o v l d e c J t h a t «.no l o c a _ 
? I F > V , U \ \ : ^ ] \ ^ U \ n l ( \ V ' «JU,r.P y9ni t i o n " ^ " f U M made shall exceed two hun-
Idaho 2G6 1(9 V S51 138 Am St Hop 201.
 d r e d f o c t i n ] n v ^ h ^ ^ {hQ yQ[n ^ o a c h 
Anno: 7 LRA(NS) 856-8G3. locator, with an additional claim for dis-
6 Bennett v. l larkrader , 158 ITS 441, 39 coverv." "Flagstaff Silver Min. Co. v. Tar-
I, ed 104G, 15 S Ct S63: Hammer v. Garfield hot, 98 US 463, 25 L ed 253. 
Min. & Mill. Co. 130 US 291, 32 L ed 9G4,
 T h e r u j e s o f t h e e a r | y m j n e r s prescribed 
9 S Ct 518. the extent of ground which miners could 
? Kern Oil Co. v. Crawfoid, 143 Cal 298, severally appropriate for mining, and the 
7G P 1111, 3 LUA(NS) 993 conditions upon which such ground could 
8 Silver King Coalition Mines Co. v. Conk- b e acquired and held. Jackson v. Roby, 109 
ling Min. Co. 255 US 151, G5 L ed 5G1, 41 US 440, 27 L ed 990, 3 S Ct 301. 
S Ct 310; Nicholls v. Lewis & C. Min. Co. 1330 USCA § 23 
18 Idaho 224 109 P 846 28 LRA(NS) 1029.
 A n n o : 5(j L R A 2 9 4 : 7 T j R A ( N S ) 7 7 3 f 8 i 2 _ 
Anno: 7 LHA(iNS) M>3.
 8 4 S R 2 8 L p v A ( N S ) 1029; 58 Am St Rep 
9 Kins" v. Amv & S. Consol. Min. Co 152 2GG 
US 222, 38 L ed 419, I t S Ct 510; Cation The maximum width allowable for a lo-
\ Old 23 Colo 433, 48 P G87. :>S Am St cation within (he boundaries of a placer 
Hop 256 claim is 25 feet on each side of the vein. 
Anno: 52 Am St Ite]> 093
 A 1 1 R n s a M i n i M i n & jAlu<] Cn v p u n i e r 
The location, as made on the surface, de- o« Colo 5G. 50 P 170, 50 LHA 289, 77 Am 
termines the extent of the locator's l ights i^t Hep ?4r) 
heneath the MM face Did Monte Min & ' A patent for a mining location of 600 feet 
: ^ i " / ' " v J ' , ' ' 1 !,L,:,,l,Vo iwV, L M l l ! C ° - ^ v-"l]i<1 «« <" *««* extent. un«W the Act of 17J I S 55, 43 L ed <2, IS S Ct 89,. C o n ^ i e ^ of May 10, 1872 Pai lev's |»-„k 
10 Campbell v Ullct, 1G7 V^ 11G, 42 L ed Silver Min Co v. Kerr, 130 US 256, 32 L 
101. 17 S Ct 76") od 906, 9 S Ct 511. 
11 Carnphell v Ullet, 167 US 11G, 42 L ed The purpose of the requirement that the 
101, 17 S Ct 7G5 end lines shall he parallel is to pive the 
Tunnels are run in the hope of discov- claimant as much of the lode on its down-
ering a vein, and, if one is found, there ward course as he has at the surface, but 
must be a location in order to create a no more. Anno: 53 LRA 492. 
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and failure or refusal to comply with it may nullify (he attempted relocation.15 
Of course, a harmless error will not be given that effect. The mere fact thai 
a notice of the relocation of a placer claim, for example, refers to the claim 
as a lode instead of a placer will not invalidate the proceeding, if the error 
is duly corrected and nobody is misled thereby.16 
An amended relocation of a mining claim, made after the land has reverted 
to the public domain, cannot cure the defect in the original relocation arising 
out of the fact that the land was not then subject to entry, where intervening 
r ights in favor of a th i rd person have been created.17 
D. RIGHTS OP LOCATOR 
1. I N GENERAL 
§ 104. Generally.—The r ights accorded the locator of a mining claim are so 
numerous and important as to war ran t regarding his estate as a species of 
property.1 8 The s tatutes not only give him the exclusive r ight of possession 
and enjoyment,19 including the privilege of convert ing to his own use the 
minerals tha t he may extract,2 0 but also permit him to locale a millsite,1 cut 
timber,2 and appropr ia te water for mining purposes.3 Jn some mining regions, 
the customs of the miners allow him to appropr ia te a convenient area of 
irround for the deposit of tailings.4 
AVIiile it appeal's tha t a locator losing or abandoning his claim may, in a 
proper case, remove any improvements tha t he has placed thereon, provided 
he a d s with due diligence,6 it is well settled tha t a person who made no ef-
fort to acquire any character of title to 1 lie land he occupies has no right to 
recover compensation for his bet terments when another makes a legal entry.0 
§ 105. Possession.—By virtue of the Federal s tatute,7 a valid location, wheth-
er lode or placer,8 segregates the land embraced therein from the public do-
main9 and operates as a grant by the United States of the right of present 
l5Clason v. Matko, 223 U S 646, 56 L ed not extend to o the r lauds ad jacen t (hereto . 
5S8, 32 S (1t 392; Wilson v. F r e e m a n , 29 Uni ted S t a t e s v. P lowman, 216 US 372, 5 \ 
Mont 470, 75 P 84, 68 LRA 833. L ed 523, 30 S Ct 209. 
A relocation is absolutely void where the A mining company t ha t buys wood cut 
dec la ra tory s t a t e m e n t does not show com- by an ag r i cu l tu ra l e n t r a n t on minera l land 
plianco with a s t a t u t o r y r e q u i r e m e n t t h a t is l iable to the Uni ted S ta t e s for the value 
a new discovery shaf t shall he sunk, or of the t imber . 1 Junker Hill & S. Min & 
that the old one shall be deepened 3 0 feet. Concentrat ing- Co. v. United S ta te s , 22G US 
Wilson v. F r e e m a n , 29 Mont 470, 75 P 84, 548, 57 L. ed 345, 33 S Ct 138. 
68 LUA 833. 3
 S e e s u p r a f 5 74, 
J%Cnl%9\ UalPh' 252 U S 28G' ° 4 L e<1 567' 4 A n n o : G3 A m Dec 10G' 
40 S C t 6l\. -p j i e f n c t t ^ a j . a m i ne r has customari ly 
H n r o w n ^ v . Curney , 201 U S 184, 50 L ed abandoned ta i l ings does not r ende r it nec-
717, 26 S Ct 509. e s sa ry to con t inue to do so. Doughe r ty 
18 See infra, §107. V. Creary , 30 Cal 200, 89 Am Dec 116. 
19 See infia, §105. 5 Sec 27 Am J u r 259, IMPROVEMENTS. 
20 Forbes v. Craoev, 94 US 762, 21 L ed 6 S p a r k s v. P ierce , 115 US 408, 29 L ed 
313; U e l a u a i e & II. Canal Co. v. Hughes , 428, 6 S Ct 102; Deffeback v. Hfiwke, 115 
183 Pa 66, 38 A 568, 38 LRA 826, 63 Am St US 392, 29 L ed 423, 0 S Ct 95. 
Rep 743. 7 00 URCA § 26. 
Anno : 49 L R A ( N S ) 966. 8 Clipper Min. Co. v. Eli Min. & Land Co. 
1 See supra . §73. 194 ITS 220, 48 L ed 9 11, 24 S Ct 632 
2 United S ta t e s v. P lowman , 216 US 372, 9 St. Louis Min Sr Mill. Co v. Montana 
54 J, ed 5 \3, 30 S Ct 2<H>, United S t a t e s v. Min Co. 171 US 610, 43 L ed 320. 19 S c t 
United Vetde Copper Co 196 US 207, 49 L 61 : Rebecca Cold Min. Co. v. B i y a n t , 3! 
ed 449, 25 S Ct 222. Colo 119, 71 P 1110, 1013 Am St Rep 17; Mt 
Anno: 70 LRA 901; Ann Cas 1917A 12. Rosa Min. Mill. & Land Co. v. Pa lmer , 26 
The r ight to cut t imber from the public Colo 56, 56 P 176, 50 LRA 289, 77 Am St 
domain for use in mininpr purposes is a Rep 245; F lynn Croup Min. Co. v. Murphy, 
c i rcumscribed one under the Fedeia l s t a t - 18 Idaho 266, 109 P 851, 138 Am St Rej) 201: 
u tes ; and while the r igh t ex tends to l ands N a s h v. M c N a m a t a , 30 Nev 111, 93 P 405, 16 
known to be valuable for minera ls , it does L R A ( N S ) 168, 133 Am St Rep 694; Risch 
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by, any person adversely Interested. Stato 
v. Cox, 87 Ohio St. 313, 101 N. EL 135, 138; 
State ex rel. Gardiner v. Diekmann, 175 Mo. 
App. 513, 157 S. W. 1012, 1015; In re City of 
Covington, 170 Ky. 110, 195 S. W. 439, 410; 
Janlu T. J,ogan, 209 Ky. 811, 273 S. W. 531, 
532; Van Alen v. Superior Court in and for 
Los Angeles County, 37 Cal. App. G90, 174 P. 
672; Sauerniann v. El Paso Electric Ky. Co. 
(Tex. Com. App.) 235 S. W. 548. 
"Kw parte" in the heading of a reported 
case, signifies that the name following is tha t 
of the party upon whose application the case 
is heard. 
In its primary sense, ex parte, as applied to nn 
application In a Judicial proceeding, means that it 
Js mado by a person who is not a parly to tho pro-
ceeding, but who has an interest in tho matter 
which entitles him to make tho application. Thus, 
in a bankruptcy proceeding or nn administration 
action, an application by A. H , a creditor, or (ho 
like, would bo described as made "ex parte A. I).,'* 
i. e.f on the part of A. B. 
In its moro usual sense, ex parte means that an 
application is made by one party to a proceeding in 
tbo nb&onro of tho other. Thus, an ex parte injunc-
tion is one granted without tho opposite party hav-
ing had notice of tho application. It would not bo 
called "ex parte" if ho had proper notico of it, and 
chose not to appear to oppose 1L Sweet. 
EX PARTE MATERNA. On the mother's 
s ide; of the maternal line. 
EX PARTE PATERNA. On the father's side ; 
of the paternal line. 
Tho phrases "ex parte rruUcma*' and "ex parte 
patema," denote tho line or blood of tho mother or 
father, and have no such restricted or limited sense 
as from the mother or father exclusively. Danta 
T. Demarest, 24 N. J. LAW, 43L 
EX PARTE TALIS. A writ that lay for a 
bailiff or receiver, who, having auditors ap-
pointed to take his accounts, cannot obtain 
of them reasonable allowance, but is cast into 
prison. Fitzh. N a t Brev. 129. 
Ex paucis dictis Intendere plurima possfs. T,itt 
5 384. You can imply many things from few 
expressions. 
Ex paucis plurima conclpit Ingenium. L l t t § 
550. From a few words or hints the under-
standing conceives many things. 
EX POST FACTO. After the fact ; by an act 
or fact occurring after some previous act or 
fact, and relating thereto ; by subsequent mat-
ter ; the opposite of ab initio. Thus, a deed 
may be good ab initio, or, if invalid at its in-
ception, may be confirmed by matter ex post 
facto. 
EX POST FACTO LAW. A law passed after 
the occurrence of a fact or commission of an 
act, which retrospectively changes the legal 
consequences or relations of such fact or deed. 
By Const. XL S, a r t 1, § 10, the states are for-
bidden to pass "any ex post facto law." In 
this connection the phrase has a much nar-
rower meaning than Its literal translation 
would Justify, as wifi appear from the ex-
tracts given below. 
The phrase "ex post facto," in the constitution, 
oxtends to criminal and not to civil eases. And 
under this head is included: (1) Every law that 
makes an action, done before the passing of the 
law, and which was innocent when done, criminal, 
and punishes such action. (2) Every lnw that ag-
gravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was 
when committed. (3) Etvcry law that changes tho 
punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment than 
tho law annexed to the crime when committed. (4) 
Every law that alters the legal rules of evidence, 
and receives less <>r different testimony than the 
law required at the time of the commission of 
the ofTense, in order to convict the offender. All 
these, and similar laws, are prohibited by the consti-
tution. IJut a law may be ex post facto, and still not 
am^nablo to this constitutional Inhibition; that is, 
provided it mollifies, Instead of aggravating, tho 
rigor of tho criminal law. Poston v. Cummins, 16 
Ha 102, CO Am. Dec. 717; Cummings v. Missouri, 4 
Wall. 277, 18 I* Ed. 356; IT. S v. Hall, 2 Wash. C. 
C. 366, Fed. Cas. No. 15,285; Woart v. Wlnnlck, 3 
N. IT. 473, 14 Am Dec. 3Si; Calder v. Pull, 3 Dall. 
3d0, 1 U Ed. 648; 3 Story, Const 21?; State v. Dope-
man, 254 P. 4r>i, 143 Wash. 99; State v Malloy, 95 
S. C. 441. 78 S E. 995, 997, Ann. Cas. 1915C, 1053; 
Commonwealth v. ICalck, 239 Pa. 533, S7 A CI, 62: 
Malloy v. South Carolina, 237 U S. 1^ 0. 35 S. Ct. 507, 
508. 59 D. Ed. 905; Tucker v State, l i Old. Cr. 5i, 
167 P. 637, 638; People v. Chicago, B. A Q. It. Co., 
323 III. 536, 151 N. E 468; Jones v. Stato, 9 Okl. Cr. 
616, 133 P. 249, 252; Illgglnbotham v. Stato, 88 Fla. 
26, 101 So. 233, 235; Fithian v. Centannl, 159 La. 831, 
106 So. 321, 323; Stato ex rel Jones r. Malllnckrodt 
Chemical Works, 249 Mo 702, 156 S. W. 967, 975; 
Putcher v. Majbury (D. C.) 8 F.(2d) 155, 159; In re 
Jamestown Caucus Daw, 43 R. I. 421. 112 A. 900, 902; 
Stato v. Lyons, 183 Wis. 107, 197 N. W. 578, 5S3; Peo-
ple v. Camporlingo, 69 Cal. App. 466, 231 P. 601, 603; 
Stato v. Teasloy, 191 Ala. 574, 69 So. 723, 725, Ann. 
Cas 1918E, 317; Plachy v. State, 91 Tex. Cr. R. 405, 
239 S. W. 979, 93J ; State v. Slusher, 119 Or. l i t , 248 
P. 358, 360; Cain v. State, 10"> Te*. Cr. R. 201, 287 
S. W. 262, 263; Bcazell r. Stato of Ohio, 269 U. S. 
167, 46 S Ct. 68, 70 U Ed. 216; Commonwealth v. 
United Cigarette Mach. Co., 120 Va. 835, 92 S. E. 
901, 902; People ex rel. Liebowitz v. Warden of 
New York County renltentiary, 174 N. Y. S. 823, 
824, 186 App. Div. 730; Armstrong v. Commonwealth, 
177 Ky. 690, 198 S. W. 24, 26. 
An ex post facto law Is one which renders an act 
punishable, in a manner in which it was not pun-
ishable when committed. Such a law may inflict 
penalties on tho person, or pecuniary penalties 
which swell the public treasury. The legislature 
is thercfoie prohibited from passing a law by which 
a man's estate, or any part of It, shall be seized 
for a crime, which was not declared, by some pre-
vious law, to ronder him liable to such punishment. 
Fletcher v Peck, 6 Cianeh, 87, 138, 3 L. Ed. 162 
Tho pin In and obvious meaning of thl3 prohibition 
Is that tho legislature shall not pass any law, after 
a fact done by any citizen, which shall have rela-
tion to t in t Dirt, so as to punish that *hloh was 
Innocent when done; or to add to tho punishment 
of that which wai ct lmlnal; or to incrense the 
malignity of a cr ime; or to retrench the rules of 
evidence, so as to make conviction more easy. 'I his 
definition of an ex post facto law is sanctioned by 
long usage. Strong v. State, l Black. (Ind.) 196. 
The term "ex post jarto law," In tho United States 
constitution, cannot bo construed to include and to 
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prohibit the enacting any law after a fact, nor cnren 
to prohibit the depriving a citizen of a vested right 
to property. Caldor v. Dull, 3 Dall. $86, 1 U Ed. 
648. 
"Kx post faoto" and "retrospective" aro not con-
vertible terms. The latter is a term of wider sig-
nification than the former and includes it. All 
ex post facto laws aro necessarily retrospective, but 
not e convorso. A curative or confirmatory statute 
la retrospective, but not ex- post facto. Constitutions 
of nearly all the states contain prohibitions against 
tfj? post facto laws, but only a few forbid retrospec-
tive legislation in specific terms. Black, Const. 
ProhJb. §J 170, 172, 222. 
Retrospective laws divesting vested rights are Im-
politic and unjust; but they are not "ex past faoto 
laws," within the meaning of the constitution of 
the United States, nor repugnant to any other of 
its provisions ; and, If not repugnant to the state 
constitution, a court cannot pronounce them to b* 
void, merely becauso in their judgment they aro 
contrary to the principles of natural Justice. Al-
bee v. May, 2 Paine, 7-1 Fuel. Cas. No. 134. 
I'ivery retrospective act Is not necessarily an ex 
post faoto law. That phrase embraces only such 
laws as Impose or affect penalties or forfeitures. 
Locke v. New Orleans, 4 Wu.ll. 1?2, IB U Ed. 334. 
Retrospective laws which do not impair the ob-
ligation of contracts, or affect vested rights, or par-
take of the character of ex post facto laws, are not 
prohibited by the constitution. Bay v. Gage, 36 
Barb. (N. Y.) 447. 
Ex prajcedentibus ot conscquentibiis optima fit 
intorprotatio. 1 Holl. 374. The best interpre-
tation is made from the context. 
EX PROPRIO MOTU. Of his own accord. 
EX PROPRIO VIGORE. By their or its own 
force. 2 Kent, Comm. 457. 
EX PROViSIONE HOMINIS. By the provi-
sion of man. By the limitation of the party, 
as distinguished from the disposition of the 
law. 11 Coke, 80ft. 
EX PROVISIONE MARITI. From the pro-
vision of the husband. 
EX QUASI CONTRACTU. From quasi con-
tract . Fleta, lib. 2, c. GO. 
EX RELATIONE. Upon relation or informa-
tion. Legal proceedings which are instituted 
by the attorney general (or other proper per-
son) in the name and behalf of the state, but 
on the information and a t the instigation of 
an individual who has a private interest in 
the matter, a re said to be taken "on the re-
lation' ' (ex relatione) of such person, who is 
called the "relator." Such a cause is usually 
entitled thus: "State ex rel. Doe v. Koe." 
In the books of reports, when a case is said 
to be reported ex relatione, it is meant that 
the reporter derives his account of it, not 
from personal knowledge, but from the rela-
tion or narrat ive of some person who was 
present at the argument. 
EX RiGORE JURIS. According to the rigor 
or strictness of l a w ; in strictness of law. 
Fleta. lib. 3. c. 10, 5 3. 
EX SCRIPTIS OLIM VIS1S. From writings 
formerly seen. A term used as descriptive of 
that kind of proof of handwrit ing where the 
knowledge has been acquired by the witness 
having seen letters or other documents pro-
fessing to be the handwriting of the party, 
and having afterwards communicated per-
sonally with the party upon the contents of 
those letters or documents, or having other-
wise acted upon them by written answers, 
producing further correspondence or acquies-
cence by the party in some matter to which 
they relate, or by the witness transacting 
with the party some business to which they 
relate, or by any other mode of communica-
tion between the party and the witness which, 
in the ordinary course of the transactions of 
life, induces a reasonable presumption tha t 
the letters or documents were the handwrit-
ing of the party. 5 AdoL & K. 730. 
EX SHIP. See Ship. 
EX STATUTO. According to the statute, 
Fleta, lib. 5, c. 11, § 1. 
EX STIPULATU ACTIO. In the civil law. 
An action of stipulation. An action given to 
recover marriage portions. Inst. 4, 0, 20. 
EX TEMPORE. From or in consequence of 
t ime; by lapse of time. Bract, fols. 51, 52. 
I'JX diuturno tempore, from length of time. 
Id. fol. 51ft. 
Without preparation or premeditation. 
EX TESTAMENTO. From, by, or under a 
will. The opposite of aft intcstato (q. v.). 
Ex tota materia emergat rosolutlo. The ex-
planation should arise out of the whole sul>-
ject-matter ; the exposition of a s ta tute 
should be made from all i ts par ts together. 
Wing. Max. 238. 
Ex turpi causa non oritur actio. Out of a base 
[illegal, or immoral] consideration, an action 
does [can] not arise. 1 Selw. N. P. 63 ; Broom, 
Max. 730, 732; Story, Ag. § 105. 
Ex turpi contractu actio non oritur. From an 
immoral or iniquitous contract an action does 
not arise. A contract founded upon an illegal 
or immoral consideration cannot be enforced 
by action. 2 Kent, Comm. 466; Pig. 2, 14, 
27, 4. 
EX UNA PARTE, Of one par t or s ide; on 
one side. 
Ex uno discos onines. From one thing you 
can discern all. 
EX UTRAQUE PARTE. On both sides. 
Dyer, 120ft. 
EX UTRISQUE PARENTIBUS CONJUNCT!. 
Related on the side of both pa ren t s ; of the 
whole blood. Hale. Com. Law, c. 11. 
EX VI TERMINI. From or by the force of 
the term. From the very meaning of the ex-
pression used. 2 BL Oomm. 100, 115. 
AFFIDAVITS 
1* Affidavit of Guy Warthen 
2. Affidavit of C- F- Boone 
JOHN BURKE 
1875 SOUTH STATE 
SPANISH FORK, UTAH 84660 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
SPANISH FORK 
VS. 
JOHN BURKE, 
CITY, : 
PLAINTIFF : 
DEFENDANT 
: AFFIDAVIT: 
: CASE No. 
: JUDGE: 
STATE OF UTAH ] 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF UTAH ] 
I c.fri BOONE, of 1240 West 890 South, Provo Utah, 84601 
being first duly sworn do hereby depose and say that: 
I have visually surved the Spanish Fork City Electric 
storage yard, and have found these conditions to exsist 
1. There are piles of old and broken power poles found without 
any kind of structure, for the obscurance of the visual contact 
to the public. 
2. There are numorus transformers setting in open storage 
about the yard of the municipal electric company. In my opinion 
children could climb the fence and be injured while climbing 
on these transformers. 
3. There are large and small reels of cable, and some empty 
reels struin about the yard, which should also be stored in 
a structure for the prevention of danger to children. 
4. There is piles of discarded and rusty metal about the pro-
perty, pallets made of wood which may be a potential nesting 
inviorment for rodents. 
Dated this ;££# day of May, 1994 
Ur¥'jQfrW&* 
C. if. Boone. Affiant. 
State of Utah, County of Utah. 
On this ^ K day of /ty<ZtS , 1994, personally appeared 
and known to me to be the person whose name is subscribed to 
this instrument, and acknowledged that he executed the same. 
Witness my hand and official seal. 
YVONNE A. 
Notary Public 
STATE OF 
MyComm Expires 
924 W 630 N OREM 
JOHN BURKE 
1875 SOUTH STATE 
SPANISH FORK, UTAH 84660 
TELEPHONE: 798-3861 
IN THE UTAH STATE COURT OF APPEALS 
SPANISH FORK CITY, 
PLAINTIFF/APPEALEE 
vs. 
JOHN BURKE, 
DEFENDANT/APPEALANT, 
AFFIDAVIT. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
I, Guy Warthen of 248 East 300 South, Spanish Fork, Utah, 
being first duly sworn do hereby depose and say that: 
Spanish Fork City by means of complaint, and in a Court 
of law did convict me of violation of a city ordinance, towit 
I was declared a nuisence, and ordered to remove all bicycles 
stored in the front of my business, or in the event that I did 
not comply I was under the threat of going to JAIL, until all 
the bikes could be removed by the city or the plaintiff. 
As the Channel 5 News heard of the cities threat to put 
me in jail and aired this event on the T.V. news and the city 
not wanting bad publicty, in my opinion, did allow a plea bargin 
which amounted to the following 
1. I was to remove approximatly 200 bikes, take down part 
of my fence, re-establish the fence, which is of chain link 
construction, in a smaller perimiter and put in sight obscuring 
slats, to store the remainder of the bikes that I was allowed 
to keep in the front of the store by vertue of the aggrement 
between the city and myself. The amount of the bikes I was allow-
ed to keep was about 100, plus parts, 
I want to make clear that this storage of the 100 bikes 
plus parts is not in a structure, but in a open air fenced area. 
I Guy Wather, certify that on this 23 day of May, 1994 
I have complied with the demands of the City/Plaintiff, not 
volintarily, but under duress of the Court in threatening to 
put me in jail. 
The above statements are made by me, Guy Warther, freely 
and to the best of my knowledge are true and correct. 
Dated this 23 day of May, 1994. 
WdJ\AJ\$.\J 
Gu# War' ther Affiant 
State of Utah, County of Utah. 
On this i-A^  day of May, in the year 1994, before me personally 
appeared Guy Warthej^, personally known to me to be the person 
whose name is subscribed to this instrument, and acknowledged 
that they executed it. 
Witness my hand and official seal.cV
 c- >\ 
Notary Public ) 
,
 y<£$^ SUSANS. DAWS 
i f/i&£$& WWtvpVdl'C'STAnollTti 
• ^rmZ^Wi CENTRAL B^Nh 
1 NOR^H MA.N 
y S f *^HF9PK UTAH WW!) 
C0MM.CXP. 4-13-s? 
CFRTTFTCATF OF MAILING 
I certify mat on the day of June, 1994,1 mailed vial United 
States Postal Service, postage prepaid, or hand delivered a copy of the 
forgoing ADDENDUM to: 
S. Junior Baker 
TAYLOR, BAKER & HICKEN 
P.O. Box 288 
Spanish Fork, Utah 84660 
DATED this /rf?j£ day of June, 1994 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
